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PHIPPS V. NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
In Phipps v. North Dakota Department of Transportation,' the North
Dakota Department of Transportation appealed from the district court's
judgment reversing an administrative hearing officer's decision to suspend
Priscilla Carol Phipps' driver's license.2 Upon review, the North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling, concluding that a chemi-
cal test is performed when a breath, blood, or urine sample is taken and pre-
served for analysis, and a test performed exactly two hours after driving is
performed within two hours of driving.3
A deputy sheriff stopped Priscilla Carol Phipps for speeding at 12:49
a.m. and subsequently arrested her for driving under the influence of alco-
hol.4 Upon arrival at the Mercer County Law Enforcement Center, Phipps
was given two breath samples, one at 2:43 a.m. and the second at 2:49 a.m. 5
The results of the tests indicated that Phipps had a blood alcohol level of. 13
percent at 2:49 a.m.6 The final air sample for the Intoxilyzer test was taken
one minute after the final test results at 2:50 a.m. 7
At the administrative hearing, the hearing officer admitted the results
of the test and suspended Phipps' driver's license for ninety-one days.8 The
administrative officer based his findings on the North Dakota Supreme
Court ruling in Keepseagle v. Backes,9 in which the court held that a blood
test is complete for purposes of compliance with the two hour time limit at
the moment the blood sample is taken from the arm and not when the ulti-
mate testing process has been finished.10 The hearing officer believed the
same should hold true for breath alcohol testing."1 Therefore, the hearing
officer concluded that the time the test is administered is the time the
1. 2002 ND 112, 646 N.W.2d 704.







9. 454 N.W.2d 312 (N.D. 1990).
10. Phipps v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2002 ND 112, T 3,646 N.W.2d 704, 706.
11. Id.
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sample is taken and analyzed, not the time of the ultimate conclusion of the
testing sequence.12
The district court reversed the hearing officer's decision and concluded
that the test was not performed within the allowed two-hour period.1 3 The
final step of the test, the air test, was actually completed one minute beyond
the two-hour time limit at 2:50 a.m.14 The district court concluded that the
case ultimately turned on the meaning of the word "performance" as it is
used in section 39-20-03.1 of the North Dakota Century Code.15 The dis-
trict court concluded that the "performance" of the test was not complete
until the final air sample, which would have made the test invalid because it
exceeded the two-hour limit. 16
Upon review, the Department argued that the district court erred by
concluding "performance of a chemical test," under section 39-20-03.1, re-
quired the completion of each step in the testing sequence.1 7 In analyzing
the statute, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that "performance"
under section 39-20-03.1 is satisfied once a single sample is preserved for
analysis.18 The Department further argued that Phipps' performance of her
chemical test was "within" two hours because the definition of "within"
includes the exact time at the outermost limit of the period.' 9 The North
Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the use of "within two hours" in sec-
tion 39-20-03.1 includes the outermost limits of a time frame; thus Phipps'
performance of a chemical test at 2:49 a.m. was within two hours of 12:49,
the time she was driving.20 Ultimately, the court held that "performance of
a chemical test" as used in the North Dakota Century Code is satisfied when
a breath sample is taken and preserved for analysis, and because "within,"
as used in the North Dakota Century Code, includes the outermost limits of




15. Id. 8 8, 646 N.W.2d at 708. Section 39-20-03.1 of the North Dakota Century Code states
in part:
[Ihf a person submits to a test under section 39-20-01, 39-20-02, or 39-20-03 and the
test shows that person to have an alcohol concentration of at least ten one-hundredths
of one percent by weight ... at the time of the performance of a chemical test within
two hours after the driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle, the
following procedure should apply ....
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-03.1 (1999).
16. Phipps v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2002 ND 112, 5J 4, 646 N.W.2d 704, 706.
17. Id. 9, 646 N.W.2d at 708.
18. Id. 14, 646 N.W.2d at 709.
19. Id. 15.
20. Id. 22, 646 N.W.2d at 711.
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driving. 21 The court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded
for reinstatement of the administrative suspension of Phipps' driving
privileges. 22
Chief Justice VandeWalle dissented.2 3 Justice VandeWalle stated that
he agreed with the trial court that under the current prescribed method the
final room air test is part of the entire Intoxilyzer test, which must be
administered within the two-hour period required by the statute. 24 He
believed that "once we veer from the regulations promulgated by the State
Toxicologist, we are on uncharted seas."2 5
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE-MISCONDUCT-DISBAR
IN RE CRARY
Paul T. Crary contested allegations of misconduct raised by disci-
plinary counsel, and a hearing was held before a hearing panel. 26 The hear-
ing panel recommended that Crary be disbarred and pay restitution to the
victim of his misconduct.27 The unopposed recommendation was submitted
to the North Dakota Supreme Court and was adopted with an additional
requirement that Crary pay the costs of the disciplinary hearing.2 8
Crary's wife became acquainted with Mary Harris in 1997, and in
August, Harris asked Crary to prepare a new will for her.29 Crary also pre-
pared a power of attorney giving him authority to act for Harris. 30 In
December of 1997, a codicil was prepared for Harris giving Crary's wife
one-half of any funds Harris's estate received from insurance companies
and a grandfather clock.31
Harris also requested investment assistance from Crary, and he helped
her purchase three annuities from the Independent Order of Foresters
(IOF).32 Crary never disclosed to Harris that he was an agent of IOF or that
21. Id. 5 23.
22. Id.
23. Id. 5 25 (VandeWalle, J., dissenting).
24. Id. 30, 646 N.W.2d at 712.
25. Id. 29.
26. In re Crary, 2002 ND 9, 5 1, 638 N.W.2d 23, 24.
27. Id.
28. See id. n. 1 (explaining that even though Crary tendered his resignation from the Bar and
did not oppose the recommendation, resignation does not halt disciplinary proceedings).
29. Id. T 2. Crary had been licensed to practice law in North Dakota since 1965. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. T 3, 638 N.W.2d at 25.
32. Id. T 4. Two of the annuities were purchased from available funds, but one of the
annuities was purchased with the proceeds of an existing annuity that she paid penalties to cash in.
Id.
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he would receive commissions on the annuities she purchased. 33 Harris
loaned Crary $3,500 in September 1998, which was never repaid. 34
Crary and his wife assisted Harris with day-to-day activities until the
relationship deteriorated in January of 2000.35 The relationship was
terminated in January of 2000, and disciplinary counsel filed for a petition
for discipline in October of 2000.36 The hearing panel concluded that the
loan, the annuity purchases, and the preparation of the codicil were all
prohibited transactions under North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.8.37 The hearing panel recommended disbarment and the payment
of restitution. 38
The court reviewed the panel's findings that Crary had received a loan
from Harris, failed to advise her to seek other legal counsel regarding the
loan, and never repaid the loan.39 During the hearing, Crary claimed that
the $3,500 was not a loan but reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses.
The court disagreed, however, noting that Crary had no agreement re-
garding payment for the personal services provided for Harris, and Crary
did not argue that the money was for legal services. 4o The court affirmed
the panel's conclusion that Crary's actions regarding the $3,500 loan vio-
lated Rule 1.8(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct.41
The panel concluded that Crary's actions in assisting in the purchase of
the annuities without disclosing his agent status or the fact that he would
receive commissions on the purchases was a violation of Rule 1.8(b).42
Though Crary claimed Harris should have known that he was an agent
because he brought the applications and helped her fill them out, the court
33. Id. Harris was an eighty-five year old woman who had a stroke before the annuities
purchase. Id. t 25, 638 N.W.2d at 29.
34. Id. 5 5, 638 N.W.2d at 25. Harris testified that the loan was to be repaid within six
months with eight percent interest. Id.
35. Id. 2, 638 N.W.2d at 24.
36. Id. 6, 638 N.W.2d at 25.
37. Id. (citing N.D. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8.
38. Id.
39. Id. 8, 638 N.W.2d at 25-26.
40. Id. 11, 638 N.W.2d at 26.
41. Id. 12 (citing N.D. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8(a)). Rule 1.8(a) prohibits a lawyer from
entering into financial transactions with a client unless it is fair and reasonable to the client and the
client consents to the transaction after being advised to seek other representation. Id. 1 8, 638
N.W.2d at 25-26 (citing N.D. R. PRO'L CONDUCT 1.8(a)).
42. Id. 1 13, 638 N.W.2d at 26 (citing N.D. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8(b)). Rule 1.8(b) pro-
hibits the use of client information to the disadvantage of the client to further the lawyer's interest
unless the client consents after being advised to seek other legal counsel. Id. at 26-27 (citing N.D.
R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8(b)).
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did not find that claim plausible. 43 The court concluded that Crary's actions
in regards to the annuities were a violation of Rule 1.8(b).44
The court also affirmed the panel's conclusion that preparation of a
codicil in which his wife was a beneficiary was a violation of Rule 1.8(c). 45
Crary did concede at the hearing that an inheritance of between $130,000
and $180,000 was substantial.46 Although Crary claimed that Harris re-
quested the codicil, the court noted that the rule strictly prohibited the
preparation of the codicil where a family member was a substantial bene-
ficiary.47 The court concluded that the preparation of the codicil was a
violation of Rule 1.8(c).48
While evaluating the disbarment recommendation, the court evaluated
the factors set forth in the North Dakota Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions and the numerous aggravating circumstances.4 9 Disbarment under
the standards is appropriate when the attorney has acted without informed
client consent about an adverse interest that is to the attorney's own benefit
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to the client.50 Applicable
aggravating factors in Crary's case included prior disciplinary offenses, a
dishonest or selfish motive, multiple offenses, vulnerability of the client,
refusal to acknowledge the wrongfulness of the conduct, indifference to
making restitution, and substantial experience in the practice of law.5' In
addition to ordering the disbarment, the court ordered that Crary pay
restitution to Harris and pay the proceeding costs. 52
43. Id. 5 15,638 N.W.2d at 27.
44. Id. (citing N.D. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8(b)).
45. Id. 5 16 (citing N.D. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8(c)). Rule 1.8(c) prohibits the preparation
of an instrument that substantially benefits the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer unless the
client is related to the donee. Id. (citing N.D. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8(c)).
46. Id. T 17, 638 N.W.2d at 28.
47. Id. 5 19. The court noted that the purpose of Rule 1.8(c) was to require a client to receive
independent legal advice before executing an instrument giving a substantial gift to a lawyer or his
family. Id. $ 21, 638 N.W.2d at 29.
48. Id. 5 22 (citing N.D. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8(c)).
49. Id. 5 23 (citing N.D. STANDARDS IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS). Standard 4.3 governs
the sanctions for attorney conflict of interest violations. Id. (citing N.D. STANDARDS IMPOSING
LAWYER SANCTIONS 4.3). Aggravating factors are set forth in standard 9.22. Id. 5 24 (citing
N.D. STANDARDS IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.22).
50. Id. 5 23 (quoting N.D. STANDARDS IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 4.3).
51. Id. T 25, 638 N.W.2d at 29-30. Crary was disciplined in 1994, refused to acknowledge
that his actions were wrong, refused to repay the loan, and never offered to repay the commissions
he earned on the sale of the commissions. Id.
52. Id. T 27, 638 N.W.2d at 30.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE-TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
CASS COUNTY JOINT WATER DISTRICT V. 1.43 ACRES OF LAND
The primary issue taken up in this case is one of first impression in the
United States. 53 The case addresses whether a state may condemn land
within its territorial boundaries which has been purchased in fee by a
federally recognized tribe that is not reservation land, aboriginal land,
allotted land, nor trust land.54 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that
neither tribal sovereign immunity nor the Federal Nonintercourse Act, 25
U.S.C. § 177, prohibited an in rem condemnation action against the land
and that the trial court erred in dismissing Roger Shea as a defendant.
55
The land at issue was ceded to the United States in a series of treaties
between 1851 and 1873 by the Mdewakanton, Wahpakoota, Sisseton, and
Wahpeton bands of Sioux Indians.56 By the late 1800s, the land was trans-
ferred by patent to the Northern Pacific Railroad and has been privately
owned for more than 100 years. 57 Cass County Joint Water Resource
District (the District), a political subdivision of the State of North Dakota
charged with managing Cass County water resources, attempted to acquire
1.43 acres of land in Highland Township in southwest Cass County in
conjunction with a dam construction project on the Maple River in 1994.58
Roger Shea, a Cass County rancher, conveyed the land to the Turtle
Mountain Band of Chippewa (the Tribe) with a warranty deed for $500 on
July 28, 2000, which maintained Shea's right to graze his livestock. 59 On
February 6, 2001, Shea executed a quitclaim deed conveying his right to
graze on the land for one dollar. 60 The July 28, 2000, warranty deed was
recorded on February 6, 2001, but the quitclaim deed was not.61
The District brought this condemnation action on the 1.43 acres
naming the Tribe and Shea as defendants. 62 The Tribe sought dismissal
claiming that sovereign immunity prevented the court from asserting in
personam jurisdiction and that the court lacked jurisdiction on the matter.63
On appeal, the District argued the court did not need in personam
53. Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, 6, 643 N.W.2d
685,688.
54. Id.
55. Id. 5 1, 643 N.W.2d at 687.
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jurisdiction over the Tribe because condemnation is purely in rem and that
sovereign immunity does not apply in this case. 64
The supreme court held that condemnation is strictly an in rem
action. 65 The North Dakota Supreme Court then held that the proceeding in
rem was against the property itself and therefore in personam jurisdiction
was not required. 66 The court stated, "[A] decision in rem does not impose
responsibility or liability on a person directly, but operates directly against
the property in question ... irrespective of whether the owner is subject to
the jurisdiction of the court in personam." 67
The Court went on to delineate the differences between in rem and in
personam jurisdiction as outlined in Shaffer v. Heitner:68
[S]tate authority to adjudicate was based on the jurisdiction's
power over either persons or property. This fundamental concept is
embodied in the very vocabulary which we use to describe
judgments. If a court's jurisdiction is based on its authority over
the defendant's person, the action and judgment are denominated
"in personam" and can impose a personal obligation on the
defendant in favor of the plaintiff. If jurisdiction is based on the
court's power over property within its territory, the action is called
"in rem" or "quasi in rem." The effect of a judgment in such a
case is limited to the property that supports jurisdiction and does
not impose a personal liability on the property owner, since he is
not before the court.
69
The court further noted that there must also be sufficient minimum
contacts between the party and the forum in the state to satisfy the Consti-
tution's Due Process Clause. It concluded that this case posed no such
problem.70 Furthermore, in order to comport with due process, the property
owners of record must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard in the
condemnation action.7t
The court next addressed the Tribe's contention that its sovereign im-
munity bars condemnation actions.72 The court did not rule on the question
64. Id. 5 7.
65. Id. 5 8.
66. Id. at 689.
67. Id. 5 9 (citing 20 AM. JUR. 2D, Courts § 80 (1995)).
68. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
69. Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, 5 10, 643
N.W.2d 685, 689 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 199) (alteration in original).
70. Id. at 689-90 (citing Smith v. Smith, 459 N.W.2d 785, 787-88 (N.D 1990)).
71. Id. 5 11, 643 N.W.2d at 690 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-15-18(2), 32-15-20 (1996);
N.D. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1)(F)).
72. Id. T 12, 643 N.W.2d at 690-9 1.
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whether tribes enjoy immunity; rather, it held that the case at bar asked
"whether tribal sovereign immunity bars a purely in rem action against land
held by the Tribe in fee and which is not reservation land, allotted land,
aboriginal land, or trust land."73 Furthermore, the Tribe presented no case
which held that sovereign immunity bars an in rem condemnation action in
state court.7
4
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that there may be
broader exercise of state court jurisdiction over tribal lands in in rem
proceedings as opposed to in personam proceedings. 75 The Supreme Court
upheld a Washington State county's imposition of ad valorem tax on real
property held in fee by tribal members of the tribe itself.76 In that case,
Yakima County sought foreclosure on the lands for nonpayment of taxes
and the tribe defended by claiming tribal sovereign immunity.77 The Court
held "that the ad valorem property tax was an in rem tax upon the property
itself, and therefore permissible, but the excise tax [on the same property]
was transactional, implicating in personam jurisdiction, and was
impermissible. 78
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that "the Supreme Court of the
United States has addressed the analogous question of whether a state's
sovereign immunity bars a condemnation action in the courts of another
state."79 The court held that based on the facts in this case the State of
North Dakota could assert its jurisdiction in rem under the auspices of the
District and that Tribal sovereignty was not implicated by this action.80 The
court based its ruling on the fact that the nature of the land was not
reservation land, allotted land, aboriginal land, trust land or was under
federal superintendence. Finding for the Tribe would allow tribes to assert
far-reaching control over states' exercises of their inherent eminent domain
powers.81
73. Id. at 691.
74. Id.
75. Id. 5 13 (citing County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. 251 (1992)).
76. Id. 115 (citing Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. at 264-66).
77. Id. 513.
78. Id. 5 15 (citing Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. at 264-66).
79. Id. 19 (citing State of Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924)). The State
of Georgia purchased land in the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, for use as a railroad yard. Id.
Chattanooga sought condemnation on part of the land owned by Georgia for use as a right-of-way
for a street. Id. Georgia argued that it was not subject to Tennessee jurisdiction because of its
sovereign immunity. Id. The Supreme Court held that Georgia's claim of sovereign immunity did
not deprive a Tennessee court the authority to condemn the property. Id. (citing State of Georgia,
264 U.S. at 479-82).
80. Id. 20-21,643 N.W.2d at 694.
81. Id. 21,643 N.W.2d at 695.
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The Tribe also argued that, even if the condemnation action was not
barred by tribal assertion of immunity, the condemnation of the property
violated the Federal Nonintercourse Act.82 The court held that at the time
of its enactment, the Nonintercourse Act was "intended to protect Indian
tribes by ensuring Indian lands were settled peacefully and Indians were
treated fairly, and to protect them from the 'greed of other races' and 'artful
scoundrels inclined to make a sharp bargain."' 83 The North Dakota
Supreme Court reasoned that "Congress did not distinguish between Indian
trust lands and Indian fee lands when enacting the statute, 'presumably
because it did not contemplate that Indian tribes could hold land in fee
simple.' "84
Once the federal government removes restraints on alienation of land,
the land cannot come back under the protective umbrella of the Noninter-
course Act merely because it is acquired by an Indian tribe.85 The court
concluded, "[T]he Nonintercourse Act does not apply to land which the
Tribe has purchased in fee, which is located hundreds of miles from its
reservation, which had never been held in trust for the Tribe, and which had
been privately owned for more than one hundred years." 86
82. Id. 5 26 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000)). "No purchase, grant, lease or other conveyance
of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe Indians shall be of any
validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to
the Constitution." Id. $ 26 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 177).
83. Id. (citations omitted).
84. Id. (quoting Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Maine, 112 F.3d 538, 549 (1st Cir.
1997)). The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the United States Supreme Court "has never
determined whether the Indian Nonintercourse Act applied to land rendered alienable by Congress
and later reacquired by an Indian tribe. Id. T 28 643 N.W.2d at 696 (citing Cass County v. Leech
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 115 n.5 (1998)). Lower courts have, however,
determined that the Nonintercourse Act does not apply to the type of land discussed in 1.43 Acres
of Land. Id. 5 28-29 (quoting Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th
Cir. 1993)).
85. Id. T 32, 643 N.W.2d at 697. In Anderson & Middelton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian
Nation, 929 P.2d 379 (Wash. 1996), the Supreme Court of Washington stated:
[O]nce the United States removes restraints on alienation of Indian land.., the
protections of the Nonintercourse Act no longer apply. Reacquisition of the land by
the Nation does not change this result since "parcels of [Indian] land approved for
alienation by the federal government and then reacquired by the Tribe [do] not then
become inalienable by operation of the Nonintercourse Act."
Cass County Joint Water Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, T 30, 643 N.W.2d 685, 696
(quoting Anderson & Middelton Lumber Co., 929 P.2d at 387).
86. 1.43 Acres of Land, T 33, 643 N.W.2d at 698.
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CIVIL RIGHTS-RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY-EQUAL PROTECTION
OLSON V. BISMARCK PARKS & RECREATION DISTRICT
In Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation District,87 the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Kathleen Olson and Amy How-
ard's negligence claim, holding that the Bismarck Parks and Recreation
District's (District) immunity from suit for recreational use of property did
not violate the equal protection clause of the North Dakota Constitution. 88
Olson and Howard were injured while sledding on property that was
"owned, operated, and maintained by the District." 89 During the winter
months, the District opened this property to the public, free of charge, for a
wide variety of winter activities. 90 A number of signs posted at the top of
the hill warned the public to use caution. 91 Further, the signs warned that
the District was not responsible for accidents. 92
After being injured, Olson and Howard sued the District for "negligent-
ly [failing] to maintain the sledding area in a safe and hazard-free condition
for its users." 93 The District contended that it was immune from liability
pursuant to North Dakota's recreational use immunity statutes, codified in
Chapter 53-08 of the North Dakota Century Code.94 In response to the Dis-
trict's contention, Olson and Howard claimed that the recreational use im-
munity statutes violated their equal protection rights under the North
Dakota Constitution. 95 The trial court, determining that the recreational use
immunity statutes were constitutional, dismissed the lawsuit. 96
In its opinion, the court analyzed past decisions that discussed the
recreational use immunity statutes, as well as legislative changes to the
language of the statutes. 97 However, the court acknowledged that a
determination of the "constitutionality of the [recreational use immunity]
statutes as ...applied to a public landowner[s]" was a question of first
impression. 98
87. 2002 ND 61,642 N.W.2d 864.
88. Olson, 5 1,642 N.W.2d at 865.
89. Id. T 2.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 866. The hill was not "groomed or maintained for sledding." Id.
92. Id.




97. Id. 5T 7-8, 642 N.W.2d at 867-68.
98. Id. 5 8, 642 N.W.2d at 868.
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The court began the opinion by stating that a statute can violate equal
protection either as applied or in its effect.99 However, as a general rule, an
individual can only bring an equal protection claim based on how the
statute is applied to that individual.100 Further, statutes are presumed
constitutional, and an equal protection challenge requires the court to
determine whether there is a "close correspondence between the statutory
classification and the legislative goal."'01
The court reasoned that a significant number of courts throughout the
country have upheld the constitutionality of recreational use immunity
statutes.102 The court further stated that the 1997 decision in Hovland v.
City of Grand ForksI03 wherein the court reasoned that equal protection
violations can occur even if immunity is provided for injuries occurring on
public land, was merely dicta and did not control its decision in the present
case. 104 Instead, the court determined that there was a close correspondence
between the recreational immunity statutes and the legislative goals of those
statutes.1 05 On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that
the great majority of states have statutes that limit the liability of land-
owners who allow the public to use their land for recreational purposes.
106
The court determined that recreational use immunity statutes create two
distinct classes of individuals: those who use another's land free of charge
for recreational purposes and all other individuals who use another's
land.107 The statutes are meant to limit the tort liability of landowners who
allow the public to use their land free of charge for recreational purposes.
108
However, landowners who engage in willful and malicious conduct can still
be held liable for their acts.109
Olson and Howard argued that providing public landowners with
immunity is not justified because public land by its definition is open to the
public. 110 The court disagreed, following several other jurisdictions, and
99. Id. T 10.
100. Id.
101. Id.5 11.
102. Id. 5 12, 642 N.W.2d at 868-69.
103. 1997 ND 95,563 N.W.2d 384.
104. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist. 2002 ND 61, 13, 642 N.W.2d 864, 869
(quoting Hovland, 5 8, 563 N.W.2d at 386-87).
105. Id. at 870.
106. Id. T 6, 642 N.W.2d at 867.
107. Id. T 14, 642 N.W.2d at 870.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. 5 15.
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held that the purpose of the statutes-limiting tort liability for landowners
who open their land to the public-applies equally to the government. I"I
The court further explained that Olson and Howard were using the hill
voluntarily and free of charge when the injuries occurred, that sledding has
"many inherent risks and dangers," and that individuals who voluntarily en-
gage in recreational activities are presumed to have consented to injuries
that are foreseeable. 12 The court acknowledged that there might be situa-
tions where the recreational use immunity statutes, as applied, would vio-
late the constitution, but the instant situation did not provide such a case.113
As such, summary judgment in favor of the District was appropriate."14
Justice Neumann, joined by Justices Maring and Sandstrom, wrote
separately, concurring with the decision of the majority." 5 Justice Neu-
mann was concerned with the broad language of the act.1 16 Specifically, he
was concerned that the act covered not only recreational facilities, but also
"every publicly owned building, road and 'ways' in the State of North
Dakota."117 Justice Neumann reasoned that citizens who used public streets
and sidewalks would be treated differently depending on their reason for
being there-whether they were using the streets and sidewalks for recrea-
tional purposes." 8 Justice Neumann was also troubled with the "inclusion
of 'education' in the definition of 'recreational purposes,"' which could
result in limiting the liability of public schools because students attend pub-
lic schools free of charge.11 9 However, because Justice Neumann's con-
cerns were not part of the fact pattern in the instant case, he concurred with
the decision. 120
Justice Maring wrote a special concurrence.121 Justice Maring agreed
with the result in the case but determined that the purpose of the recreation-
al use immunity statutes had changed since their original enactment.1 22
Justice Maring reasoned that although the initial purpose of the statutes had
been to encourage private individuals to allow the public to use their land
111. Id. (quoting Gard v. United States, 594 F.2d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 1979)).
112. Id. J 16, 642 N.W.2d at 871.
113. Id.
114. Id. 17.
115. Id. J 20 (Neumann, J., concurring).
116. id. 22, 642 N.W.2d at 871-72.
117. Id. at 871.
118. Id. at 871-72.
119. Id. at 872. However, in situations where students pay to use the school, such as for
extracurricular activities, the school's duty of care might be elevated. Id.
120. Id. 5 23.
121. Id. 5 25 (Maring, J., concurring).
122. Id.
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for recreational purposes, that purpose changed when the Legislature
changed the definition of land to include both public and private land.1
23
Justice Maring stated that the purpose of the statute was to "prevent the
'closing' of public lands" used for recreational purposes "in the aftermath
of the abolishment of sovereign immunity."124 Justice Maring also thought
that the language from the majority opinion stating that sledding has "many
inherent risks and dangers" and that individuals who voluntarily engage in
recreational activities are presumed to have consented to foreseeable
injuries was mere dicta. 25
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT
FARGO V WONDER
Nancy Wonder was in attendance at a Fargo party on April 7, 2001 that
resulted in a loud party complaint. 26 The police were admitted to the apart-
ment and did not allow anyone to leave until each partygoer provided
identification proving they were of legal age to drink alcohol.127 Partygoers
under the age of twenty-one were required to take a preliminary breath
screening test (PBST) before they were allowed to leave.128 Wonder's
PBST tested positive for alcohol and she was arrested under Fargo's minor
in consumption ordinance. 129
The case was transferred from municipal court to district court when
Wonder requested a jury trial.130 The trial court ordered suppression of the
evidence against Wonder after determining that Wonder's constitutional
rights had been violated.131 The City appealed and the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court. 1
32
The trial court determined that Wonder should have been read her Mir-
anda rights (Mirandized); therefore any statements she made should be
suppressed, including whether she raised her hand indicating that she was
123. Id. "'Land' includes all public and private land, roads, water, watercourses, and ways
and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment thereon." Id. 5, 642 N.W.2d at 867
(quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-01(2) (1999)).
124. Id.
125. Id. 526.
126. City of Fargo v. Wonder, 2002 ND 142, 5 2, 651 N.W.2d 665, 667.
127. Id. T 3, 651 N.W.2d at 668. Once their age was verified, partygoers were allowed to
leave. Id.
128. Id. The underage partygoers were not told they were free to leave. Id. Instead, they
were told that they were required to take the test and were not advised of their Miranda rights. Id.
129. Id. 4.
130. Id. 5.
131. Id. T 6.
132. Id. 11,651 N.W.2d at 667.
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not twenty-one. 33 The resolution of whether or not Wonder should have
been Mirandized revolved around whether or not the under age partygoers
were asked to raise their hands thereby possibly implicating themselves in a
crime. 134 The City conceded that if the under-age partygoers had been
asked to raise their hands, there would have been custodial interrogation.135
Although the City argued that only partygoers over age twenty-one were
asked to raise their hands, the court concluded that there was sufficient
evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the partygoers under age
twenty-one were asked to raise their hands in violation of Miranda, so their
statements should be suppressed.136
The City then argued that Miranda did not apply to identifying data
gained during the booking process. 37 The court noted that this argument
did not apply because the questioning at issue was not done during booking
but done while still establishing an element of the crime, therefore Miranda
applied, and the statements should be suppressed. 138
The trial court also ruled that the results of Wonder's PBST should be
suppressed because administration of the PBST was a warrantless search
that was conducted without individual, particularized suspicion of Won-
der.139 The City claimed that no search warrant was needed because Won-
der consented to the test.140 The court noted that consent must be voluntary
and not coerced.14' The court referred to the trial court's finding that under
the circumstances present, the partygoers would not have voluntarily con-
sented and the court agreed.142 The court also noted that the record did not
support any individual, particularized suspicion that Wonder had committed
133. Id. 5 6, 651 N.W.2d at 668. The Court's decision in Miranda requires that a person be
informed of certain rights before they are interrogated while in custody. Id. 5 10, 651 N.W.2d
668-69. There was no question that the partygoers were in custody; the question was whether they
were interrogated. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 669.
136. Id. 5 11. Though no officer specifically remembered what happened at the party, two
officers testified that it was standard procedure to ask those under the age of twenty-one to raise
their hand. Id.
137. Id. 13. The Court's decision in Miranda does not apply to biographical questions
raised during booking. Id.
138. Id. 5 15, 651 N.W.2d at 670. The court noted that there has been a conflict in the
court's regarding the application of Miranda when the booking question relates to an element of
the crime. Id. 14.
139. Id. 17. A search made without a warrant is unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment unless an exception applies. Id. ff 18. The burden of proving that an exception applies is on
the party who is attempting to use the evidence produced by the warrantless search. Id.
140. Id. 20, 651 N.W.2d at 671. Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. 22. It was not established conclusively whether or not Wonder consented to the
test. Id. 21.
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a crime and emphasized that mere presence at a crime scene does not justify
a warrantless search.143 The court concluded that the trial court did not err
in suppressing the PBST results. 44
After affirming the suppression motions, the court considered Won-
der's motion that portions of the City's appellate brief appendix be struck
and that the City bear the costs of bringing this motion.1 45 The City con-
ceded that two documents in the appendix were not part of the record and
the court determined that the improper materials must be struck from the
appendix.146 The court then evaluated whether sanctions were necessary to
encourage compliance with the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure.147 Costs were assessed in the amount of $486.00 as a sanction to the




Petitioner Jerome Kelsh is a State Senator for North Dakota Senate
District 26, which was organized under a redistricting plan following the
2000 census.149 Under this plan, approved by the Legislature, Kelsh was
elected to a four-year senate term in the 2000 election.150 Following the
2000 census, the Legislature and Governor approved another redistricting
plan in 2001 that placed Senator Heitkamp's residence into a newly
designed Senate District 26.151 This plan required Senator Kelsh to seek
reelection to the senate seat after serving only two years of his four-year
term.152 In the new election Senator Kelsh would run against incumbent
State Senator Joel Heitkamp.153 Senator Heitkamp was elected in Senate
District 27 in 1998.
Section 54-03-01.8 of the North Dakota Century Code allowed Senator
Kelsh to retain his seat without an election and fulfill his four-year term
143. Id. 23.
144. Id. 24.
145. Id. T 25. Only items from the record may be included in the appendix to a brief. Id.
26, 651 N.W.2d at 672 (citing N.D. R. APP. P. 30(a)).
146. Id. 55 26, 28.
147. Id. 5 27 (citing N.D. R. APP. P. 13). This rule authorizes sanctions to encourage respect
for and compliance with the rules. Id. (citing N.D. R. APP. P. 13).
148. Id. 5 28.
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only if Senator Heitkamp "filed a written statement ... agreeing that there
need not be an election in District 26 for state senator in 2002."154 Heit-
kamp did not file such a statement and the statute effectively truncated
Kelsh's senate term from four years to two years.155 Kelsh petitioned the
North Dakota Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a
writ of prohibition, which would have enjoined Secretary of State, Alvin
Jaeger, from administering the District 26 primary and general elections in
2002.156
A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that prevents an in-
ferior body or tribunal from acting without or beyond its jurisdiction when
there is no other "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy" in law.' 57 The court
noted the power is discretionary and cannot be invoked as a matter of right.
The court has limited the exercise of original jurisdiction to questions of
publici juris that affect state sovereignty, the franchises or prerogatives of
the state, or the liberties of its people.158 The court denied the writ but exer-
cised original jurisdiction to issue remedial writs under article VI, section 2,
of the North Dakota Constitution. 159
The court determined this case involved:
[T]he people's right to elect representatives to the state Legislature
and the Legislature's right to truncate the terms of elected repre-
sentatives by legislative redistricting. The case involves the
people's right of franchise and the Legislature's authority to effect-
ively disenfranchise some of the electorate. Few matters encom-
pass more public interest than issues involving the power of the
people to govern themselves through the voting process. 160
Because this case speaks to fundamental rights and the right of the
electorate to choose its leaders, the court concluded the case warranted its
use of original jurisdiction.161 Senator Kelsh asserted section 54-03-01.8, as
amended, violated article IV, section 4 of the North Dakota Constitution,
which requires senators be elected for four years.162 The court was thus
required to construe this provision of the state constitution and determine
whether section 54-03-01.8 violated it.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. 1,641 N.W.2d at 102.
157. Id. 2.
158. Id. 55 2-3.
159. Id. 55 1,3, 641 N.W.2d at 102-03.
160. Id. 5 3 (citing Wefald v. Meier, 347 N.W.2d 562, 564 (N.D. 1984)).
161. Id.
162. Id. 4 (citing N.D. CONST. art. IV § 4).
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After discussing the law of statutory construction, the court discussed
State ex rel. Williams v. Meyer.163 The senator in Meyer had been elected to
a four-year term in 1908 and was required to run after serving two years
following the redistricting plan of 1910.164 The court in Meyer relied on
section 27 of the constitution, the precursor to article IV, section 4 of the
current North Dakota Constitution, which stated, "Senators shall be elected
for the term of four years, except as hereinafter provided."165 The Meyer
court allowed the truncation of the senate term based on section 30 of the
constitution, the precursor to article IV, section 3 of the current North
Dakota Constitution, which dictated that half of the North Dakota Senate
should be elected in one biennial election and half in the next biennial
election.166 Section 30 of the constitution provided for the truncation of the
1890 senate class in order to maintain this fifty-fifty staggering of senate
elections.167 The court, relying on the provision that stated "except as here-
inafter provided," allowed for the truncation of the 1890 senate terms as
provided for under section 30.168 The court held that section 27's consti-
tutional mandate of four year senate terms was subservient to section 30
because of the "except as hereinafter provided" phrase and ruled section 30
could truncate senate terms in post-1890 redistricting plans in order to
maintain the biennial election of half the senate seats. 169
The section 27, "except as hereinafter provided," phrase relied upon in
Meyer was deleted by North Dakota voters in a 1984 election that created
the new constitutional mandate of four-year terms. 170 The new language
became effective December 1, 1986.171 The constitutional provision was
again amended by voters in 1997, still absent the "except as hereinafter
provided" phrase relied upon by the Meyer Court. 172
With that language deleted from the constitution in the case at bar, the
North Dakota Supreme Court determined there were two conclusions that
could be drawn from the decision of the North Dakota voters in deleting the
language: one, their vote was meant to prevent the truncation of senate
terms, or two, it was meant to delete unnecessary surplusage from the North
163. Id. TJ 8, 641 N.W.2d at 104-05 (citing State ex rel. Williams v. Meyer, 127 N.W. 834
(1910)).
164. Id. T 8, 641 N.W.2d at 104.
165. Id.
166. Id. T 9, 641 N.W.2d at 105.
167. Id. 8-9.
168. Id. J 9.
169. Id.
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Dakota Constitution.173 The court was consequently required to interpret
the constitution and reconcile apparent inconsistent provisions.174  The
court reasoned that if article IV, section 4 is read literally to mean an abso-
lute bar on the truncation of four-year senate terms, the Legislature would
be severely hampered in accomplishing its constitutional mandate to es-
tablish a redistricting plan that gave every elector an equal vote and ensur-
ing the provision's purpose in mandating the election of one-half of the
senate members biennially. 75 The court determined that the voter's over-
riding objective in deleting the "except as hereinafter provided" phrase from
the constitution was to remove surplusage and not to prevent the truncation
of senate terms. 176
The court concluded that the language of the constitution requires that
half the senators be elected in one biennial election and half in another bien-
nial election and not that the Legislature and Governor be prohibited from
truncating terms. 177 The court noted that the Washington Supreme Court in
State ex rel. Christensen v. Hinkle178 allowed for the truncation of senate
terms without its constitution stating similar language to "except as herein-
after provided," even though the Washington Supreme Court relied on the
Meyer decision. 179
While the court allowed the Legislature to truncate senate terms, 180 it
struck down section 54-03-01.8 of the North Dakota Century Code, which
would have allowed a state senator, Senator Heitkamp in this case, the abili-
ty to prevent an election by filing a written statement with the Secretary of
State agreeing there need not be an election.181 The court determined this
provision would have no effect on the constitutional requirement of four-
year terms because it impermissibly placed in the hands of one person the
power to determine whether or not the district electorate would be entitled
to elect their senator. 182 The court held that the Legislature unlawfully dele-
gated its authority by giving a single person unfettered discretion to stop an




176. Id. 55 14-15, 641 N.W.2d at 106-07.
177. Id.
178. 13 P.2d 42 (Wash. 1932).
179. Kelsh v. Jaeger, 2002 ND 53, 5 16, 641 N.W.2d 100, 107 (citing Hinkle, 13 P.2d at 44).
180. Id. 5 19, 641 N.W.2d at 108.
181. Id.5 20.
182. Id. 5 23, 641 N.W.2d at 109-10.
183. Id.
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The court further justified the truncation of Senator Kelsh's term by
holding that because the Senate District 26's constituency shifted sig-
nificantly and ultimately amounted to 46.6 percent change. 84 The court
ruled that this shift justifies the truncation of a state senate term under the
constitutional requirement that a senator be elected from a district and ruled
that although not every change in a district's constituency necessitates an
election, a change of this size does.185 Because nearly one-half the electors
of District 26 never had an opportunity to elect a state senator from the
district or had a hand in electing Senator Kelsh in the 2000 election, the
truncation of Senator Kelsh's term was further justified for this reason. 186
CRIMINAL LAW-CIVIL COMMITMENT-STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
IN THE INTEREST OF M.B.K.
In In the Interest of M.B.K.,187 M.B.K. pled guilty to and was sentenced
for gross sexual imposition in district court.188 Prior to his release from
prison, the State filed a petition alleging that M.B.K. was a sexually
dangerous individual and should be civilly committed.189 The district court
found probable cause to believe that M.B.K. was sexually dangerous and
sent him to the North Dakota State Hospital for evaluation. 90 M.B.K.
appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, which affirmed the district
court's decision. 191
Upon arrival at the State Hospital, M.B.K. was evaluated by three indi-
viduals, including one independent evaluator. 192 All three evaluators testi-
fied at the hearing, which concurred with the district court determination
184. Id. 25, 641 N.W.2d at 110.
185. Id. T 29, 641 N.W.2d at 110-11.
186. Id. 31, 641 N.W.2d at 111.
187. 2002 ND 25,639 N.W.2d 473.
188. In re M.B.K., 5 2, 639 N.W.2d at 474.
189. Id. Section 25-03.3-01(8) of the North Dakota Century Code defines a sexually
dangerous individual as the following:
Sexually dangerous individual" means an individual who is shown to have engaged in
sexually predatory conduct and who has a congenital or acquired condition that is
manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or
dysfunction that makes that individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually
predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or safety
of others. It is a rebuttable presumption that sexually predatory conduct creates a
danger to the physical or mental health or safety of the victim of the conduct. For these
purposes, mental retardation is not a sexual disorder, personality disorder, or other
mental disorder or dysfunction.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(8) (2002).
190. In re M.B.K., 5 3, 639 N.W.2d at 475.
191. Id.
192. Id. 1 4. Section 25-03.3-12 of the North Dakota Century Code gives the right to request
an independent evaluator. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-12 (2002)).
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that there was clear and convincing evidence that M.B.K. was a sexually
dangerous individual.193 Therefore, pursuant to section 25-03.3-13 of the
North Dakota Century Code, M.B.K. was civilly committed.194 M.B.K.
appealed the decision, claiming that the "State failed to establish he was
'likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct,"' and thus
there was insufficient evidence to sustain the civil commitment. 195
In its opinion, the North Dakota Supreme Court discussed at great
length the evaluations that had been conducted by the three experts who
testified at M.B.K.'s hearing.196 The court determined that the standard of
review in a case involving civil commitments for sexually dangerous
individuals should be "a modified clearly erroneous" standard.197 Applying
this standard, the court would affirm the trial court's order unless it
involved an error in interpretation of the law or the order was not supported
by evidence that was clear and convincing.198
193. Id. 5 5.
194. Id. Section 25-03.3-13 of the North Dakota Century Codes states:
Within sixty days after the finding of probable cause, the court shall conduct a com-
mitment proceeding to determine whether the respondent is a sexually dangerous
individual. The court may extend the time for good cause. At the commitment pro-
ceeding, any testimony and reports of an expert who conducted an examination are
admissible, including risk assessment evaluations. Any proceeding pursuant to this
chapter must be tried to the court and not a jury. At the commitment proceeding, the
state's attorney shall present evidence in support of the petition and the burden is on
the state to show by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a sexually
dangerous individual. An individual may not be committed unless evidence is admit-
ted establishing that at least two experts have concluded the individual has a congeni-
tal or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder,
or other mental disorder or dysfunction that makes that individual likely to engage in
further acts of sexually predatory conduct. The respondent has a right to be present, to
testify, and to present and cross-examine witnesses. Every person not necessary must
be excluded, except that the court may admit any person having a legitimate interest in
the proceeding. If the respondent is found to be a sexually dangerous individual, the
court shall commit the respondent to the care, custody, and control of the executive
director. The executive director shall place the respondent in an appropriate facility or
program at which treatment is available. The appropriate treatment facility or program
must be the least restrictive available treatment facility or program necessary to
achieve the purposes of this chapter. The executive director may not be required to
create a less restrictive treatment facility or treatment program specifically for the
respondent or committed individual. Unless the respondent has been committed to the
legal and physical custody of the department of corrections and rehabilitation, the
respondent may not be placed at and the treatment program for the respondent may not
be provided at the state penitentiary or an affiliated penal facility. If the respondent is
found not to be a sexually dangerous individual, the court shall discharge the
respondent.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13 (2002).
195. In re M.B.K., 5 6, 639 N.W.2d at 475. The three experts who conducted evaluations of
M.B.K. all agreed that he was "likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct." Id.
196. Id. 7-8.
197. Id. 5 9, 639 N.W.2d at 476.
198. Id.
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The court determined that section 25-03.3-13 required the State to
produce two experts who could independently establish the following two
elements: (1) that the defendant had a disorder and (2) that the disorder
made the defendant "likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory
conduct." 199 All three experts had established the two necessary elements,
including the defendant's independent evaluator. 200 However, M.B.K.
argued that the phrase "likely to engage" was unclear and should be
interpreted to mean "much more likely than not."201
The court acknowledged that the phrase "likely to engage" could be
interpreted in various ways.202 That ambiguity allowed the court to con-
sider extrinsic evidence to determine the proper interpretation. 203 In deter-
mining the legislative intent of the phrase, the court considered "laws upon
the same or similar subjects." 204 After discussing similar language in simi-
lar laws in other states, the court determined that the phrase "likely to
engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct" meant that the
"[defendant's] propensity towards sexual violence [was] of such a degree as
to pose a threat to others." 205 In making that determination, the court held
that civil commitment of the defendant was proper.2 06
CRIMINAL LAW-CHILD HEARSAY RULE-SEXUAL ABUSE
STATE V. HIRSCHKORN
In State v. Hirschkorn,207 the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed a
criminal judgment for class B felony gross sexual imposition entered
against Lance Hirschkorn, stating that the trial court had abused its
discretion by allowing child hearsay statements regarding sexual abuse into
evidence because the State failed to satisfy the foundational requirements
for getting the statements in. 208 The court also stated that the admission of
the hearsay statements constituted obvious error that substantially affected
Hirschkorn's rights and as a result, ordered a new trial.209
199. Id. I 11.
200. Id. T 12.
201. Id.
202. Id. 13.
203. Id. 16, 639 N.W.2d at 477.
204. Id. This consideration was statutorily allowed pursuant to section 1-02-39(4) of the
North Dakota Century Code. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-39(4) (1987)).
205. Id. 17-18.
206. Id. 19.
207. 2002 ND 36, 640 N.W.2d 439.
208. Hirschkorn, 1,640 N.W.2d at 441.
209. Id.
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On October 21, 1999, a mother discovered her five-year-old daughter
with her pants down and a Ken doll between her legs. 210 When questioned
by her mother about what she was doing, the little girl stated, "Uncle Lance
told me not to tell." 211 The mother subsequently reported the incident to the
Burleigh County Sheriff's Department. 212 On October 27, 1999, Deb
Osowski, a forensic interviewer, interviewed the little girl at a child ad-
vocacy center in Bismarck, North Dakota.213 During the interview, the little
girl revealed that Lance Hirschkorn had touched her in her private places at
her grandmother's home where Hirschkorn resides. 214 A few days later,
Hirschkorn was arrested and charged with gross sexual imposition in
violation of section 12.1-20-03(2)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code.215
Eight days before Hirschkorn was scheduled for trial, the State moved
to have the hearsay statements of the little girl allowed into evidence under
the child hearsay rule.216 After a hearing was held on the matter, the trial
court granted the State's motion, allowing Osowski and the mother to
testify at trial about what the little girl had told them regarding the sexual
abuse. 217 The little girl also testified at trial, but she was unable to recall
anyone touching her in inappropriate places.218 The jury returned a verdict
of guilty and sentenced Hirschkorn to ten years in prison, with seven of
those years suspended.219
On appeal, Hirschkorn argued that the trial court erred in allowing the
child's hearsay statements into evidence. 220 However, Hirschkorn failed to
make an objection to the hearsay statements at trial. 221 As a result, the re-
viewing court was limited to inquiring whether the admission of the child's
hearsay statements constituted obvious error affecting substantial rights






215. Id. 3 3,640 N.W.2d at 441-42. Section 12.1-20-03 states:
A person who engages in sexual contact with another, or who causes another to en-
gage in sexual contact, is guilty of an offense if: a. The victim is less than fifteen years
old; or b. He compels the victim to submit by force or by threat of imminent death,
serious bodily injury, or kidnapping, to be inflicted on any human being.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03 (1999).




220. Id. T 5.
221. Id. 6.
222. Id. (citing State v. Weist, 2001 ND 150, 5 6, 632 N.W.2d 812, 814).
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establish obvious error, the defendant has the burden of showing (1) error,
(2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights."223
The primary rule governing this case is Rule 803(24) of the North
Dakota Rules of Evidence, which deals with the admission into evidence of
child hearsay statements about sexual abuse.224 Under this rule, an out of
court statement by a child under the age of twelve about sexual abuse suf-
fered by the child is admissible as evidence if the trial court determines that
there are sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness, the child either testifies at
the proceedings or is unavailable to testify, and there is corroborative
evidence of the act.225 A hearing must be held prior to trial and notice
given to all parties in order to determine whether a child's hearsay state-
ment should be admitted.226 In this case, Hirschkorn argued that the State's
motion to admit the child's hearsay statements was untimely and that he
was given little to no notice regarding the hearing on the motion.227 In
particular, Hirschkorn's argument rested on the concept of "unfair sur-
prise." 228 The court stated that there is no deadline for bringing a motion
under Rule 803(24)(a) and that a continuance would have been the proper
remedy in the case of "unfair surprise." 229 Because Hirschkorn failed to
request a continuance, the court found that there was not error regarding the
notice and timeliness of the motion.230
Hirschkorn also argued that the State failed to establish a proper
foundation for the admittance of the child's hearsay statements. 231 The
child-hearsay rule requires that a certain indicia of reliability and trust-
worthiness exist and various safeguards strictly complied with before the
hearsay statements will be admissible.232 When determining whether there
are sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness, the court may consider factors
such as "spontaneity and consistent repetition, the mental state of the
declarant, the use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, and a
lack of a motive to fabricate." 233 The trial court must explicitly lay out the
223. Id. (citing State v. Miller, 2001 ND 132, T 25, 631 N.W.2d 587, 593-94).
224. Id. 7, 640 N.W.2d at 442.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. T 8, 640 N.W.2d at 443.
228. Id. 5 9 (citing State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 433 (N.D. 1984)).
229. Id.
230. ld.
231. ld. 5 10.
232. Id. 511.
233. Id. 5 13, 640 N.W.2d at 444 (citing State v. Messner, 1998 ND 151, 5 15, 583 N.W.2d
109, 112).
[VOL. 78:589
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
factors it considered and explain its reasons for reaching a decision
regarding the admissibility of the testimony. 234
At the hearing, the State offered minimal evidence to support the ad-
mission of the statements and the defense claimed that the evidence offered
contained misstatements of fact.235 After reviewing the record, the court
found that the trial court failed to follow the requirements set out in Rule
803(24) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. 236 The record reflected
that not only did the State not provide enough information for the trial court
to determine whether there were sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness,
the trial court did not even know the content of the statements sought to be
admitted. 237 The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting the statements into evidence because the trial court failed to
"make specific findings of the facts relevant to reliability and trust-
worthiness and explain how these facts support[ed] the conclusion of
admissibility." 238
In addition, the court found that there was plain error because the
State's motion to admit the statements was completely lacking in factual
support.239 Plain error must either affect the outcome of the proceeding or
result in prejudice to the defendant in order to affect the defendant's sub-
stantial rights. 240 The court concluded that the admission of the hearsay
testimony affected the outcome of the proceeding since there was very little
other evidence offered at trial that linked Hirschkorn to the sexual abuse. 241
If the defendant has proved obvious error affecting substantial rights, it is
within the discretion of the court to correct the error if it determines that the
error affected the public reputation, integrity, or fairness of the proceed-
ings.242 Based on the facts of this case, the court decided to correct the
error by reversing the criminal judgment and granting Hirschkorn a new
trial. 243
234. Id. (citations omitted). The court stated that it is preferable to have the trial court's
findings in writing; however, duly recorded oral findings may suffice. Id.
235. Id. 5 15, 640 N.W.2d at 445.
236. Id. 5 17, 640 N.W.2d at 446.
237. Id.
238. Id. 55 18-19.
239. Id. 19.
240. Id. 20.
241. Id. 21, 640 N.W.2d at 447.
242. Id. 22 (citing State v. Miller, 2001 ND 132, 25, 631 N.W.2d 587, 593-94).
243. Id. 55 23-24.
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CRIMINAL LAW-POST CONVICTION RELIEF-
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
WHITEMEN V. STATE
In Whiteman v. State,244 Ambrose Joel Whiteman appealed from a
judgment summarily dismissing his application for postconviction relief.245
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the district
court's ruling, holding that Whiteman had raised a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether his attorney was ineffective for failing to follow his in-
structions to appeal his criminal conviction, entitling him to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue. 246
On May 22, 1998, Whiteman was found guilty of a class A felony
murder in connection with the October 1997 death of Donald Strassberg in
Fargo, North Dakota.247 Whiteman was subsequently sentenced to life im-
prisonment without parole. 248 No appeal was taken at that time from the
criminal judgment and commitment. 249 Approximately three years later, on
June 25, 2001, Whiteman filed a pro se application for postconviction
relief, claiming he was "denied effective assistance of counsel at trial herin
[sic], and in his Direct Appeal attorney, Gordon Dexheimer as counsel
failed to file the required Notice of Appeal as requested, thereby; denying
defendant of his requested appeal." 250 The State argued that Whiteman's
application should be summarily denied because Dexheimer consulted with
petitioner following the conviction and the petitioner expressed his decision
to not appeal.251 Whiteman moved for an evidentiary hearing because
"there [was] in dispute evidence of material fact." 252 The court denied
Whiteman's request for an evidentiary hearing and granted the State's
motion for summary disposition.253 Whiteman appealed. 254
A review on appeal from a summary denial of postconviction relief is
reviewed the same as an appeal from summary judgment. 255 A trial court
may summarily dismiss an application for postconviction relief if there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judg-
244. 2002 ND 77, 643 N.W.2d 704.





250. Id. 5 3.
251. Id. 5 4.
252. Id. 5J 6, 643 N.W.2d at 707.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. 5 7 (citing Abdi v. State, 2000 ND 64, 8, 608 N.W.2d 292, 296).
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ment as a matter of law. 256 Alternatively, the party opposing the motion for
summary disposition is entitled to all reasonable inferences at the prelimi-
nary stages of a post-conviction proceeding and is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing if a reasonable inference raises a genuine issue of material fact.257
On appeal, the supreme court relied heavily on Roe v. Flores-
Ortega,258 which the United States Supreme Court reasoned that cases in-
volving allegations that counsel failed to appeal, despite a defendant's
express instructions to do so, have a presumption of prejudice and require
that a defendant establish prejudice by showing, but for counsel's failure to
file an appeal, the defendant would have appealed. 259 The court determined
that most courts articulate that prejudice is presumed per se from counsel's
failure to file a notice of appeal when so requested by the defendant. 260
Alternatively, some courts do not use a presumed prejudice holding but
indicate if a defendant shows counsel knew of the defendant's desire to
appeal and failed to file the appeal, the defendant has established both the
performance and prejudice prongs of the Strickland test.261
When evidence raises a reasonable inference of ineffective representa-
tion that creates a genuine fact issue, an evidentiary hearing on a postcon-
viction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is required.2 62 The court
determined that Whiteman's affidavits and other material submitted created
a genuine issue of material fact.2 63 Therefore, Whiteman was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.2 64 The
judgment of the district court was reversed and the case remanded for an
evidentiary hearing on Whiteman's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. 265
Justice Sandstrom wrote a concurring opinion. 266 He agreed with the
legal analysis of the majority but added that "if a defendant does not
attempt to appeal within a reasonable time or does not assert within a
reasonable time that counsel failed to follow a direction to appeal, the
256. Id. (citing Hughes v. State, 2002 ND 28, T 4, 639 N.W.2d 696, 698).
257. Id. (citing Heyen v. State, 2001 ND 126, 5 6, 630 N.W.2d 56, 57).
258. 528 U.S. 470 (2000).
259. Whiteman v. State, 2002 ND 77, 116, 643 N.W.2d at 709.
260. Id.
261. Whiteman, T 16, 643 N.W.2d at 710 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) (determining a two-pronged test that requires a defendant to show counsel's performance
was deficient and the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant)).





266. Id. 55 27-33, 643 N.W.2d at 712-13 (Sandstrom, J., concurring).
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defendant's own conduct may concede that counsel's alleged failure to act
was not responsible for the lack of a timely appeal."
267
CRIMINAL LAW-PROBABLE CAUSE-CONTROL OF A VEHICLE
HENDERSON V. DIRECTOR, N.D. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
The Department of Transportation appealed a district court decision
reversing the Department's decision to suspend Cody Darrell Henderson's
driver's license for ninety-one days.268 The North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed the judgment and remanded it to the trial court for entry of
judgment affirming the Department of Transportation's decision.
2 69
Adams County Deputy Sheriff Darrin Heinert arrested Cody Hender-
son on January 14, 2001, for driving a vehicle under the influence of
alcohol.2 70 According to section 39-08-01 of the North Dakota Century
Code, one may not operate a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of
at least ten one-hundredths of one percent by weight or while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor.2 7 1 Following an administrative hearing, the
hearing officer found that an Intoxilyzer test was given to Henderson by a
certified operator, using the approved method within two hours of the time
of driving. 272 The test showed that Henderson had a blood alcohol con-
centration of .11.273 Additionally, the hearing officer determined that Of-
ficer Heinert had reasonable grounds to believe Mr. Henderson had been
operating a vehicle in violation of section 39-08-01.274 Because of these
determinations, the Department of Transportation suspended Henderson's
driving privileges for ninety-one days.2 7 5
Henderson appealed to the district court, alleging that he had not been
in actual physical control and that the hearing examiner's findings and con-
clusions were not supported by the evidence.2 76 The district court reversed
the administrative decision and reinstated Henderson's driver's license.277
The Department of Transportation appealed the district court's reversal of
the administrative decision to the North Dakota Supreme Court.278 On
267. Id. 5 31-32, 643 N.W.2d at 713.







275. Id. 1, 3.
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appeal, Henderson contended that the judgment should not be reversed be-
cause the hearing officer erred in finding he was driving under the influence
solely because he admitted to driving after consuming alcoholic beverages,
that the admission was inadmissible, and that the officer administered the
Intoxilyzer test unfairly.279
During the administrative hearing, Deputy Heinert, Cody Henderson,
and the passenger of Henderson's vehicle, Jessie Zahn, all testified to the
events. 280 Deputy Heinert stated that he saw Henderson shoveling snow
outside of a vehicle that was stuck in a snow bank.281 Deputy Heinert also
pointed out that as he approached Henderson, Henderson had the odor of
alcohol on his breath, his speech was slurred, and there was an unopened
can of beer on the floor of the truck.282 Henderson also told Deputy Heinert
that he was the driver of the vehicle at that time. 283 The officer then asked
Henderson if he had been drinking. 284 Henderson replied that he had two or
three beers before they came down to the lake.285 According to Heinert, he
then put Henderson in the patrol car where Henderson failed the field
sobriety test and Intoxilyzer test, with an estimated blood alcohol concen-
tration of .106 percent.286 Heinert then placed Henderson under arrest for
driving under the influence of alcohol. 287 Heinert testified that he had
followed the state toxicologist's approved method for giving the Intoxilyzer
test.288 Deputy Heinert also admitted that he did not see Henderson driving
the vehicle or see him behind the wheel of the vehicle, and that he did not
know the actual driver of the vehicle until Henderson responded to his
direct questions. 289
Henderson testified that he had not consumed any alcoholic beverages
until he arrived at the lake and that he was not the driver of the vehicle at
the time Deputy Heinert appeared, which he had attempted to tell the
Deputy.290 Additionally, Jessie Zahn's testimony corroborated Henderson's
story. 29 1
279. Id. J 4, 640 N.W.2d at 717-18.
280. Id. 55 9-11, 640 N.W.2d at 719-20.










291. Id. 11, 640 N.W.2d at 719-20.
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The court determined that based on the weight of evidence from the en-
tire record, the hearing officer properly determined that Officer Heinert had
reasonable grounds to believe that Henderson had been driving under the
influence of alcohol in violation of section 39-08-01 of the North Dakota
Century Code.292 The court rejected Henderson's argument that his state-
ment was inadmissible because he was in custody at the time of the state-
ment and had not been given his Miranda warning. 293 Because there were
other factors aside from Henderson's comments that lead Deputy Heinert to
believe that Henderson was driving under the influence of alcohol, the court
determined that Heinert had probable cause to arrest Henderson and
therefore a Miranda warning had not been necessary.294
The court also rejected Henderson's argument that the Intoxilyzer test
had been unfairly administered. 295 According to section 39-20-07(5) of the
North Dakota Century Code, the results of an Intoxilyzer test must be re-
ceived into evidence if the test was properly obtained and fairly admini-
stered in accordance with the methods approved by the state toxicologist. 296
Because Deputy Heinert testified that he had followed the approved testing
method and the hearing officer had determined that Henderson was properly
tested, the court determined that the test was properly administered and the
hearing officer had reasonably found that Henderson was properly tested.297
Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
district court and remanded the case for entry of an order affirming the
hearing officer's decision.298
CRIMINAL LAW-REASONABLE SUSPICION-SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE
CITY OF DEwLS LAKE V. LAWRENCE
In City of Devils Lake v. Lawrence,299 a verbal altercation at Pop's Bar
led to the conviction of the defendant, Darrell Lawrence, on a drinking and
driving charge. 300
On September 3, 2000, a patron at Pop's Bar called the police depart-
ment and reported that a verbal altercation was taking place and that it
292. Id. 5 12, 640 N.W.2d at 720.
293. Id. T 13.
294. Id. T 14.
295. Id. T 17, 640 N.W.2d at 721.
296. Id. 5 16.
297. Id. 5 17.
298. Id. T 18.
299. 2002 ND 31, 639 N.W.2d 466.
300. Lawrence, 5 2-3, 639 N.W.2d at 467-69.
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appeared as though it might turn into a physical fight.301 Officers John
Rose and Jason Toso were dispatched to the scene of the altercation.
302
Officer Rose arrived at the bar first and was joined soon thereafter by
Officer Toso in a separate cruiser.
303
When Officer Rose arrived at Pop's Bar, he observed Conrad Houle
standing at the entrance of the bar and recognized him as someone who had
been involved in previous physical altercations. 304 Houle motioned to
Officer Rose that two other men, about to leave the bar's parking lot in a
motor vehicle, were the men involved in the altercation with him.305 About
that same time, Officer Toso arrived at the bar and was informed by Officer
Rose that based on information obtained from Conrad Houle, the men get-
ting into the vehicle were involved in the altercation and should be
"[checked out]."306 Upon speaking with the occupants of that vehicle, Of-
ficer Toso noticed the odor of alcohol, questioned the defendant, and then
placed him under arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol. 307
After being convicted in municipal court for driving while under the
influence, Lawrence appealed his conviction to the District Court of Ram-
sey County. 308 Lawrence moved the district court to suppress evidence and
dismiss the charge against him, based on the allegation that Officer Toso
had not formed the requisite reasonable suspicion to believe that he was in-
volved in any type of criminal activity when he stopped his vehicle. 309 The
district court granted the defendant's motion for the suppression of evi-
dence and dismissed the charges against him with prejudice. 310 The City of
Devils Lake appealed the dismissal.311
The issue presented in this case is whether the information Officer
Rose received from a third party and then conveyed to Officer Toso was
enough to form the valid reasonable suspicion needed to stop the
defendant's vehicle.
To stop a moving vehicle for investigative purposes, an officer must be
able to articulate a reasonable suspicion that the suspect has already broken






307. Id. 3, 639 N.W.2d at 468-69.
308. Id. 4, 639 N.W.2d at 469.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. 1, 639 N.W.2d at 467.
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a law or is about to.312 Reasonable suspicion for a stop exists when a
"reasonable person in the officer's position would be justified by some
objective manifestation to suspect the defendant was [committing] or was
about to be engaged in unlawful activity." 313 An objective standard is used
and the officer is allowed to take into account the totality of the
circumstances. 314
At the time that Officers Rose and Toso arrived at the bar, the only
information they had with regard to the altercation was that at the time of
the call, it was merely a verbal altercation but had the potential to turn
physical.3 15 They had obtained additional information at the scene from
Conrad Houle that Lawrence was a party to the altercation and that they
should talk to him as well. 316 Officer Rose also testified in court that there
were no visible signs of a physical altercation when he arrived on the
scene. 317 Based on this set of circumstances, the district court held that
arguing, by itself, is not a crime and was therefore not a sufficient basis for
an investigative stop. 318
On rehearing by the North Dakota Supreme Court, the court held that
Officer Toso was justified in making the investigative stop in order to
"freeze" the situation for further investigation. 319 The court pointed out that
a verbal altercation is, in fact, a violation of the disorderly conduct statute
and would therefore justify the stop since the crime of disorderly conduct
had been committed. 320 In response to concerns by the district court with
regard to the reliability of the information used by Officer Toso in pulling
the defendant over, the supreme court gave further support for its decision
by holding that the information obtained by one officer may be imputed to
another in order to justify the detention of a motor vehicle and its
occupants. 321
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that, taking into account
all the information the officers had obtained with regard to the scene and
312. Id. (citing State v. Gregg, 2000 ND 154, 5 27, 615 N.W.2d 515, 521).
313. Id. (citing State v. Kenner, 1997 ND 1, T 8, 559 N.W.2d 538, 540-41).
314. Id.
315. Id. 2, 639 N.W.2d at 467-68.
316. Id. at 467.
317. Id.
318. Id. 4, 639 N.W.2d at 469.
319. Id. 5 11-12, N.W.2d at 470-71.
320. Id. 1 13, 639 N.W.2d at 471-72.
321. Id. T 9, 639 N.W.2d at 470 (citing State v. Kenner, 1997 ND 1, 1 11, 559 N.W.2d 538,
541). In North Dakota, when "one officer relays a directive or request for action to another officer
without relaying the underlying facts and circumstances, the directing officer's knowledge is im-
puted to the acting officer" for purposes of determining validity of the stop. Id. (citing Kenner,
11,559 N.W.2d at 541).
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those involved in the altercation, the officers had formed the requisite
reasonable and articulable suspicion needed to "freeze the situation" by pul-
ling the defendant over for further investigation. 322 The North Dakota
Supreme Court held that the district court erred in granting the defendant's
motion to suppress and in dismissing the charges against him.323 The dis-
trict court's orders were reversed and the case was remanded for further
proceedings. 324
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENT
STATE V. KEILEN
In State v. Keilen,325 Matthew Keilen and Kristy Dykhoff appealed
their convictions for possession of controlled substances and possession of
drug paraphernalia. 326 Both Keilen and Dykhoff had entered a conditional
plea of guilty while reserving the right to appeal the denial of their motion
to suppress evidence seized as a result of an entry by law enforcement into
their apartment. 327 The North Dakota Supreme Court held there was suf-
ficient action taken by the parties to justify an appeal, that the evidence
should have been suppressed, and remanded the case for a new trial.328
On August 4, 2001, after a neighbor had reported fighting and loud
noises, Fargo police officers were dispatched to the apartment of Keilen and
Dykhoff to investigate a domestic dispute.329 The police officers spoke to a
neighbor who alerted them that he believed someone inside the apartment
might be hurt.330 The officers then proceeded to the apartment door of
Keilen and Dykhoff and listened for any noises from within the apart-
ment. 331 One of the officers knocked "for a minute or two" after identifying
himself.332 The officers heard voices inside but received no response to
their knocking. Subsequently, the two officers entered the apartment.333
Once inside the apartment, the two police officers encountered Keilen,
who had scratches on his face, and Dykhoff.334 Although both Keilen and
322. Id. J 17, 639 N.W.2d at 473.
323. Id.
324. Id. 18.
325. 2002 ND 133, 649 N.W.2d 224.
326. Keilen, 5 1, 649 N.W.2d at 226.
327. Id.
328. Id. 20, 649 N.W.2d at 231.





334. Id. 4 4, 649 N.W.2d at 227.
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Dykhoff refused help, the officers proceeded to interview them concerning
the loud noises that had been reported as coming from their apartment. 335 A
third officer arrived at the scene and observed marijuana and marijuana
paraphernalia in plain view within the apartment. 336 Based on the presence
of drugs and paraphernalia, a narcotics investigator secured a search
warrant for the apartment, which yielded contraband.337
Claiming an unlawful search, Keilen and Dykhoff moved to suppress
the evidence found as a result of the police officers entry into their apart-
ment and any subsequent incriminating evidence gathered based on the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine. 338 The motion to suppress was subsequently
denied and both Keilen and Dykhoff entered into conditional plea agree-
ments.339 The State contended that Keilen and Dykhoff failed to preserve
an appeal because their notice of appeal was not specifically from a
criminal judgment. 340
The North Dakota Century Code specifies that a defendant may appeal
a verdict of guilty, a final judgment of conviction, an order refusing a
motion in arrest of judgment, an order denying a motion for a new trial, or
an order made after judgment affecting any substantial right of the party.
341
Although Keilen's and Dykhoff s appeal was based on the memorandum on
a motion to suppress and dismiss and the order denying the motion to sup-
press and dismiss, the statute must be liberally construed so that when a
memorandum opinion contains an order that was intended to be a final
order, there exists a right to appeal. 342 Ultimately, the North Dakota
Supreme Court stated that "[w]hile the wording used by Keilen and
Dykhoff in their notice of appeal [was] less than precise," the attempted
appeal from the memorandum opinion on the motion to suppress the evi-
dence and dismiss the charges was intended to be a final order and treated
the appeal as an appeal from a final judgment of conviction.343 Therefore,
Keilen and Dykhoff adequately preserved their right to appeal the trial
court's denial of their motion to suppress. 344
On review, the court examined the issue of whether the search of the




338. Id. 1 6.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. T 7.
342. Id. 5T 7-9 (citing State v. Jelliff, 251 N.W.2d 1,4 (N.D. 1977)).
343. Id. T 9, 649 N.W.2d at 227-28.
344. Id. at 228.
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tional.345 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution protect an individuals
from unreasonable searches and seizures in their homes. 346 Police officers
need to either have a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances
in order to make a lawful entry into a home.347 The trial court denied the
motion to suppress because it determined that the officers' conduct was
justifiable under the community caretaker exception to the warrant clause of
the Fourth Amendment. 348 The court pointed out that the community care-
taker exception mainly involves vehicles, where there is a lesser expectation
of privacy. 349 Furthermore, because there was no perceptible disturbance
when the officers arrived at the apartment, the community caretaker doc-
trine does not apply since there was no probable cause plus exigent circum-
stances to enter the apartment. 350 Ultimately, the court concluded that the
evidence seized upon entry into Keilen and Dykhoff s apartment should
have been suppressed. 351 The court remanded the case to allow Keilen and
Dykhoff to withdraw their guilty pleas.352
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-PROBATIONARY SEARCH
STATE V. MAURSTAD
In State v. Maurstad,353 Maurstad appealed his convictions for pos-
session of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and manufacturing a
controlled substance.354 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
district court's denial of Maurstad's motion to suppress evidence that was
obtained during a probationary search of Maurstad, his vehicle, and his
father's business.355
When the search occurred, Maurstad was on probation for a different
drug-related offense.356 As a condition of his probation, Maurstad was re-




348. Id. 13. The court recognized the community caretaking doctrine as justifying law en-
forcement contact, including stops, without reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct. Id. 5 14
(citing State v. Glaesman, 545 N.W.2d 178, 181 (N.D. 1996)).




353. 2002 ND 121, 647 N.W.2d 688.
354. Maurstad, T 1, 647 N.W.2d at 689.
355. Id.
356. Id. 5 2.
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by any probation [officer] at any time of the day or night, with or without a
search warrant."
357
Prior to the search, Maurstad's probation officer was informed that the
Grand Forks Narcotics Task Force believed that Maurstad was manufac-
turing methamphetamine at his father's place of business.358 Based on this
suspicion, his father's shop was kept under surveillance. 359 Maurstad's pro-
bation officers told local police to stop Maurstad and conduct a search of
him and his vehicle if they saw him leaving the shop outside of regular
business hours. 360  At approximately 8:45 p.m. on May 17, 2001,
Maurstad's vehicle was stopped after leaving his father's shop. 36 1
During the search, a variety of items used for the manufacture of meth-
amphetamine were found.362 Maurstad was arrested, and an officer ob-
tained permission from Maurstad's father to search his shop. 363 During the
search of the shop, additional items used for methamphetamine production
were found.364 Maurstad moved the trial court to suppress the evidence that
was found as a result of the two searches. 365 The trial court denied the
motion, and Maurstad entered a conditional plea of guilty, allowing him to
appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.
366
Maurstad argued that the evidence obtained during the search of his
person and vehicle should be suppressed because the searches were not
done for a probationary purpose. 367 He claimed that the searches were
actually the result of a criminal investigation and therefore violated the
Fourth Amendment.3
68
Maurstad claimed that allowing a police officer to conduct a search as a
condition of his probation was a violation of section 12.1-32-07(4) of the
North Dakota Century Code, which provides the authority for imposing
conditions of probation. 369 Contrary to his claim, the court stated that sec-
tion 12.1-32-07 does not require probationary searches to be conducted by










366. Id. 5 8.
367. ld. 5 7.
368. Id. 5 12, 647 N.W.2d at 691.
369. Id. 13-15.
370. Id. 5 16, 647 N.W.2d at 692.
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decisions, as well as the decisions of other courts, for the proposition that
probationary searches can be conducted by police officers. 37 1 Further, there
is no probable cause or reasonable suspicion requirement in order for
probationary searches to be conducted. 372
In determining whether the probationary search was reasonable and
therefore valid, the court considered numerous factors, including "whether
the search was performed in a reasonable manner, whether the search was a
subterfuge for criminal investigation, and whether the search contributed to
the probationer's rehabilitation." 373 In its decision, the North Dakota
Supreme Court quoted at length from Griffin v. Wisconsin,374 in which the
United States Supreme Court held that "any search of a probationer's home
by a probation officer is lawful when there are 'reasonable grounds' to
believe that contraband is present." 375 The North Dakota Supreme Court
previously held that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Griffin
decision did not mandate reasonable suspicion in order for a probationary
search to be valid. 376 The only requirement is that the search be reasonable
"under a state's statute on probationer searches." 377
Maurstad also contended that United States v. Knights,378 decided sub-
sequent to Griffin, established that a probationary search was invalid if it
was conducted for an "'investigatory' purpose." 379 The court disagreed,
stating that the Court's decision in Knights did not require reasonable sus-
picion for a probationary search. 380 Rather, the court determined that
Knights stood for the proposition that as long as a probationary search is a
condition of probation and as long as there is reasonable suspicion to
conduct the search, it is proper under the Fourth Amendment. 381
The court also made it clear that the purpose of a probationary search
has no effect on its validity.382 This overruled a portion of State v.
Perbi,383 wherein the court held that the purpose of a probationary search
should be "considered when deciding the validity of a probationary
371. Id.
372. Id. 17.
373. Id. 18, 647 N.W.2d at 692-93.
374. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
375. State v. Maurstad, 2002 ND 121, 55 19-20, 647 N.W.2d 688, 693 (citing Griffin, 483
U.S. at 880).
376. Id. 22, 647 N.W.2d at 693-94.
377. Id. at 694 (citing State v. Smith, 1999 ND 9, T 18, 589 N.W.2d 546, 550).
378. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
379. Maurstad, T 23, 647 N.W.2d at 694.
380. Id. 5 28, 647 N.W.2d at 695.
381. Id.
382. Id. 55 29-30, 647 N.W.2d at 695-96.
383. 331 N.W.2d 14 (N.D. 1983).
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search." 384 It no longer matters whether the probationary search "was
conducted as a subterfuge for a criminal investigation." 385
Determining whether Maurstad's probationary search was valid ulti-
mately came down to two considerations: whether the search was permitted
as a condition of Maurstad's probation, and whether there was reasonable
suspicion to conduct the search.386 The court stated that reasonable sus-
picion exists for a search when there is "some objective manifestation to
suspect the defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in unlawful activi-
ty." 387 The court determined that the facts of the case provided the pro-
bation officer with reasonable suspicion to believe that Maurstad was
engaging in unlawful activity.3 8 8 Because there was reasonable suspicion,
and because a condition of Maurstad's probation allowed for probationary
searches, the searches in the instant case did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.3 89 Therefore, Maurstad's conviction was affirmed.390
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE
STATE V. LAIB
Marvin Laib appealed a criminal judgment charging him with posses-
sion of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and possession of stolen
property.39 1 On appeal, Laib argued that the trial court erred by denying his
suppression motion and by sentencing him as a third time offender to a
twenty-year prison sentence. 392 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
the decision.393
In February 2001, law enforcement officials obtained several warrants
to search Laib's residence and other buildings on his property for drugs,
drug paraphernalia, evidence of drug transactions, and stolen property.3 94
During the first search, officers uncovered $2,550 in cash, a pen containing
methamphetamine residue, a small quantity of marijuana, and a sheet listing
drug transactions. 395 While searching the shed on Laib's property, an
384. Maurstad, 5 31, 647 N.W.2d at 696.
385. Id.
386. Id. T 33.
387. Id. 5 35, 647 N.W.2d at 697 (citing City of Devils Lake v. Lawrence, 2002 ND 31, 5 8,
639 N.W.2d 466, 469).
388. Id. 5T 36-37.
389. Id. T 37. The court declined to decide "whether a suspicionless search would satisfy the
Fourth Amendment." Id. 38.
390. Id. T 40, 647 N.W.2d at 698.
391. State v. Laib, 2002 ND 95, 1, 644 N.W.2d 878, 879.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. 5 2.
395. Id.
[VOL. 78:589
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
officer noticed a blue welder and welding helmet similar to ones that had
been previously reported as stolen. 396 Officers were able to obtain a second
warrant based on the information obtained regarding the welder and
helmet.397 During the second search, the welder and helmet were seized,
along with an ounce of methamphetamine. 398 A third warrant was subse-
quently issued and executed. 399 Based on the information obtained from the
searches, Laib was charged with class A felony possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver in violation of section 19-03.1-23 of the
North Dakota Century Code and class C felony possession of stolen proper-
ty in violation of section 12.1-23-02 of the North Dakota Century Code.400
At trial, Laib moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
second search, claiming that the warrant was based upon false information
provided by a police officer.401 The trial court denied the suppression mo-
tion.402 Because Laib had previously been charged twice for class B felony
delivery of a controlled substance, the State sought a twenty-year manda-
tory minimum sentence, which was imposed by the trial court after the jury
found Laib guilty.n03 Laib was also sentenced to five years imprisonment
for possession of stolen property, which was to run concurrently with his
twenty-year sentence for drug possession.4 04
On appeal, Laib argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress evidence because the second warrant was based on false in-
formation.405 In particular, Laib claimed that the officer could not have
seen a blue welder or welding helmet on the premises during the first
search; therefore, a second warrant should not have been issued.406 The
court looked to Franks v. Delaware40 7 in addressing Laib's argument. 408 In
that case, the United States Supreme Court stated that a hearing is required
if the defendant is able to show that "a false statement knowingly and in-
tentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the





400. Id. 1 3 (citing N.D. CENT CODE §§ 19-03.1-23, 12.1-23-02 (1997)).





406. Id. 7 7, 644 N.W.2d at 881.
407. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
408. State v. Laib, 2002 ND 95, 5 5, 644 N.W.2d 878, 880 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-
56).
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of probable cause.a09 If these two elements are proven by a preponderance
of the evidence, the false information must be set aside and the warrant
examined to see if enough probable cause still exists. 410 If after the state-
ments are removed there is not enough probable cause to support the
issuance of a warrant, the evidence obtained as a result of the defective
warrant must be excluded.411
In Laib's case, an evidentiary hearing was held to determine if false
information was used to obtain the second search warrant.412 At the hear-
ing, the officer testified to seeing the welder and helmet during the first
search and that the items looked like the pictures that had been taken of
items stolen from a Jemco store.413 Laib presented testimony that the
officer could not have seen the welder and helmet because Laib lent it to a
friend prior to the first search.414 The trial court denied Laib's suppression
motion, finding "the officer's testimony to be truthful and consistent with
the facts as established through all of the witnesses." 415 The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision denying Laib's suppres-
sion motion, stating that it will not reverse the decision of the trial court if
there is sufficient competent evidence supporting the decision and the
decision is not contrary to the "manifest weight of the evidence." 416
Laib also argued that the trial court erred in sentencing him to twenty
years imprisonment under section 19-03.1-23(l)(a)(2) of the North Dakota
Century Code.417 Laib argued that the statute did not apply to him as his
two prior convictions were for marijuana, which is not considered a
schedule I or II controlled substance. 418 Laib claimed that it was his first
conviction for possession of a narcotic and therefore he should not be
subject to the mandatory minimum sentence for a third or subsequent
offense.419
In determining whether the statue applied, the court looked at the legis-
lative history and construction of the statute. 420 In this case, the legislative
history did not provide the court with any guidance, and therefore the court
409. Id. (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56).
410. Id. (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56).
411. Id. (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56).
412. Id. 5 6, 644 N.W.2d at 880.
413. Id.
414. Id. 7, 644 N.W.2d at 881.
415. Id.
416. Id. 55 8-9 (citations omitted).
417. Id. 55 10-11.
418. Id. 5511-12, 644 N.W.2d at 882.
419. Id. 12.
420. Id. 5T 12-13.
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decided to look at legislative intent.421 "In ascertaining legislative intent,
we first look to the statutory language and give the language its plain,
ordinary and commonly understood meaning."422 When interpreting a stat-
ute, the court gives meaning to every word included in the statute.4 23 If an
ambiguity exists, extrinsic evidence will be utilized to determine the legisla-
ture's intent and the ambiguity will be construed in favor of the defen-
dant.4 24 Using these standards, the court found that section 19-03.1-
23(1)(a)(2) was unambiguous because the statute included the phrase "[a]
violation of this chapter ... must be considered a prior offense under sub-
section 1."425 The Court found that Laib's two prior convictions for class B
felony delivery of marijuana constituted violations of chapter 19-03.lof the
North Dakota Century Code. Therefore, the mandatory minimum sentence
of twenty years was applicable.4 26
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-WARRANT REQUIREMENT
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA V. GUTHMILLER
Defendant Dennis Guthmiller was convicted of two drug charges, pos-
session of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and possession of
drug paraphernalia. 427 Guthmiller appealed the district court conviction on
the ground that the search warrants obtained to search his property were not
based on sufficient probable cause.428 He alleged that the search warrants
that led to his eventual conviction were based in part on information
obtained from an informant and did not establish a sufficient connection
between the suspected drug activity and his home. Guthmiller also alleged
that law enforcement's knowledge of his previous association with the drug
trade was stale and an ineffective basis for a search warrant. 429
The information obtained from the informant included a claim that a
man from Mandan, driving an older Mercedes with a four-by-four chassis,
was involved in trafficking methamphetamine. 430 Detectives had additional
information from their own investigation that the suspect vehicle was
421. Id.
422. Id. 13 (citing State v. Thill, 468 N.W.2d 643, 646 (N.D. 1991)).
423. Id. (citations omitted).
424. Id. at 882-83 (citing State v. Rambousek, 479 N.W.2d 832, 834 (N.D. 1992)).
425. Id. 5 14, 644 N.W.2d at 883; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(5)(2002).
426. State v. Laib, 2002 ND 95, T 14, 644 N.W.2d 878, 883. The court noted that other juris-
dictions have interpreted similar sentencing provisions the same way as the court did in this case.
Id. T 16, 644 N.W.2d at 883-84.
427. State v. Guthmiller, 2002 ND 116, 5 1, 646 N.W.2d 724, 726.
428. Id.
429. Id. % 17-18, 646 N.W.2d at 730.
430. Id. TT 2-3, 646 N.W.2d at 726-27.
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registered to Mr. Guthmiller and that he had been involved in controlled
drug purchases on the two days prior to the search warrant applications. 431
Detectives also knew that in the course of two controlled drug purchases, a
suspected drug dealer left the location of the drug sale, contacted Guth-
miller at a particular residence, returned with methamphetamine, and com-
pleted the sale.4 32 Guthmiller and his vehicle were present at the residence
while controlled purchases took place, but detectives knew that the resi-
dence was not Guthmiller's. 433 Detectives also had information, based on
surveillance of the defendant in 1998, which led law enforcement officers to
believe that Guthmiller had been growing marijuana in his home.434 The
totality of these circumstances, the State argued, provided probable cause to
issue search warrants for the defendant's vehicle and his residence.4 35 The
North Dakota Supreme Court agreed. 436
Such a search is subject to the Fourth Amendment and must show a
nexus between the home to be searched and the contraband sought. 437
When creating this nexus, officers may establish probable cause by the sum
total of the layers of information and the synthesis of what the police have
heard, what they know, and what they observed as trained officers. 438 The
defendant argued that such a nexus did not exist to link him from the resi-
dence where the actual drug deals took place and his own home and
vehicle.4 39
Based on the detectives' prior knowledge of the defendant's criminal
behavior, his recent suspected drug activity, his association with a known
marijuana trafficker, and the information obtained from the confidential
informant, a search warrant was sought for Guthmiller's vehicle on April 6,
2001.440 The warrant was issued and the search warrant was executed. 44 1
Due to the discovery of methamphetamine in the defendant's vehicle, a
warrant was also sought and issued for his home.442 During these searches,
officers found cash, owe sheets, methamphetamine, and a handgun. 443
431. Id. T 3, 646 N.W.2d at 727.
432. Id. T 5.
433. Id. T 4.
434. Id. 5.
435. id. T 1, 646 N.W.2d at 726.
436. Id.
437. Id. T 10, 646 N.W.2d at 728.
438. Id. (citations omitted).
439. Id. T 12, 646 N.W.2d at 729.
440. Id. TT 2-3, 646 N.W.2d at 726-27.
441. Id. 2, 646 N.W.2d at 726.
442. Id. T 3, 646 N.W.2d at 727.
443. Id. t 6.
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At trial, a detective testified as to the entire set of facts that were at
his disposal when he applied for the warrant to search the defendant's
vehicle. 444 He testified that after he received a warrant to search the defen-
dant's vehicle for evidence of methamphetamine trafficking, he observed
Guthmiller's vehicle making short trips to and from his residence shortly
after 2:00 a.m. 445 The detective testified that in his experience, a vehicle
making short trips to and from a particular place in the early morning hours
may indicate possible involvement in drug trafficking.44 6 The totality of the
factors listed above were sufficient to lead him to believe that Guthmiller
was trafficking methamphetamine out of his home.a47
Guthmiller contended that the information obtained by the detectives
did not draw the necessary link between the suspected drug activity and his
own car and residence. 448 The court disagreed with his assessment since the
standard for obtaining a search warrant is one that allows law enforcement
officers and the issuing judge or magistrate to take all factors into consider-
ation and draw reasonable conclusions based on those observations. 449
Citing State v. Rinquist,45o Guthmiller also argued that basing an appli-
cation for a search warrant on previous misconduct is improper because it
does not prove that similar conduct is still taking place.451 The court agreed
that the defendant's argument was valid but countered that even absent the
officer's knowledge of the 1998 surveillance of the defendant, the search
warrant was properly issued on the recent information by itself.452 The
court further pointed out that the defendant seemingly ignored all of the
other information on which the detectives used to base their search warrant
applications.453
The supreme court held that the evidence established probable cause
for the searches of defendant's vehicle and residence. 454 To support its
decision, the court reiterated the standard for obtaining a proper search war-
rant.4 55 Not only may officers take into account all that they know, have
heard, and have seen of the defendant, the court must "take into account
444. Id. 5 3-5, 646 N.W.2d at 726-27.
445. Id. J 5, 646 N.W.2d at 727.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. 112, 646 N.W.2d at 729.
449. ld. 5I 10, 16, 646 N.W.2d at 728, 730.
450. 433 N.W.2d 207, 213 (N.D. 1988).
451. Id. 5 18, 646 N.W.2d at 730.
452. Id. 55 21-23, 646 N.W.2d at 730-31.
453. Id. 22, 646 N.W.2d at 731.
454. Id. J 23.
455. Id. 21, 646 N.W.2d at 730-31.
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inferences and deductions that a trained and experienced officer makes." 456
The court concluded that when the detectives presented the issuing magi-
strate with the information they intended to base their search warrant appli-
cation on, "there was probable cause to warrant that a person of reasonable
caution would believe evidence of methamphetamine trafficking would be
found in Guthmiller's vehicle."
457
Finding that both search warrants were based on sufficient probable





STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA V. SKORICK
In state district court, a jury found Edward Skorick guilty of engaging
in sexual contact with a minor under the age of fifteen.459 The court sen-
tenced Skorick as a habitual offender to twenty years incarceration with the
North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 60 Skorick ap-
pealed the conviction, arguing that there was prosecutorial misconduct
during the State's rebuttal closing argument and that the court erred by
allowing a sequestered witness to remain in the courtroom after testifying
for rebuttal purposes. 461 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's decision, holding that there was not prosecutorial misconduct
and that allowing rebuttal witnesses to stay in the courtroom was harmless
error.462
During Skorick's criminal trial for gross sexual imposition, several
events occurred that led to appeal. 463 First, prior to the trial, the judge
ordered "all witnesses be sequestered until they have offered direct testi-
mony. Once they have testified I'm going to allow witnesses to remain in
the courtroom for purposes of returning as rebuttal witnesses, and I believe
that is appropriate under the rules." 464 Skorick objected to this order, but
456. Id. T 22, 646 N.W.2d at 731 (citing State v. Olson, 1998 ND 41, TJ 24, 575 N.W.2d 649,
656).
457. Id. T 16, 646 N.W.2d at 730.
458. Id. T 24, 646 N.W.2d at 731.
459. State v. Skorick, 2002 ND 190, $1, 653 N.W.2d 698, 700.
460. Id. 5 2.
461. Id. at 701.
462. Id. 11, 653 N.W.2d at 700.
463. Id. 5 2, 653 N.W.2d at 700-01. Skorick was charged with gross sexual imposition for
engaging in sexual contact with a minor under the age of fifteen under section 12.1-20-03(1)(d) of
the North Dakota Century Code. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03(1)(d) (1997)).
464. Id. 5, 653 N.W.2d at 701.
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the judge replied that the objection would be addressed if a problem
arose.465 Skorick renewed his objection on the second day of trial, while
the State was in the middle of its case-in-chief.466 This time the court
forced the witness present in the courtroom to leave.467 That witness was
later called to testify about several issues that she had heard about while in
the courtroom. 468
Second, according to Skorick, the prosecution made questionable com-
ments in its rebuttal closing argument.469 The prosecutor first made
comments about the date of a particular occurrence by stating the following:
Okay. When did [K. B.] say this happened? When did it happen?
Between fourth and fifth grade. At the end of fourth grade,
commencing fifth grade. When about after fourth grade? June,
May or June. She said 1997. The school year started in '97. It
didn't end in '97. It ended in '98. That is right as she is sitting up
there that slip is made. I think when I started out in opening
statement I said to you that it happened in '97. I missed that. And
she said '97 the way that Mr. Schoppert did. Then it is my fault
for not jumping on it and correcting it and asking some
specifics.
4 70
In making this statement, the prosecutor corrected a date error during testi-
mony and was able to argue when a particular event actually took place. 471
Other comments were made by the prosecution regarding the physical evi-
dence presented.4 72 In response to defense counsel's arguments regarding
the lack of physical evidence, the prosecutor commented, "Yup, it would be
nice if in any one of these kinds of cases I can give you physical evidence.
I dare say we wouldn't be here if I could, unfortunately." 473
These comments lead to two issues on appeal. First, whether the trial
court erred in permitting sequestered witnesses to remain in the courtroom
465. Id. Rule 615 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence does not allow a sequestered wit-
ness who might be called as a rebuttal witness to remain in the courtroom after testifying. Id.
(citing N.D. R. EVID. 615).
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id. 5 7, 653 N.W.2d at 701-02. Skorick argued that one of the critical issues was the
placement of a coffee table; if the witness had not heard testimony about the importance of the
table's placement he would not have known the critical facts he testified about. Id.
469. Id. 5 12, 652 N.W.2d at 703.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id. 5 14, 652 N.W.2d at 704.
473. ld.
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for the purpose of returning as a rebuttal witness after testifying.474 Second,
whether prosecutorial misconduct existed during the State's rebuttal closing
argument.
4 75
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred
when it permitted witnesses to remain in the courtroom after testifying for
the purpose of being a rebuttal witness.4 76 However, the court considered
the error harmless. 477 In order to reverse a case due to error, the error must
prejudice the substantial rights of the accused. 478 In this case, the rebuttal
witness supported the defense's theory that there was a coffee table in the
room. 479 Furthermore, the weight and credibility of the witness are ques-
tions for the jury.4 80 By renewing his objection before the court allowed the
witness to testify on rebuttal 481 Skorick alerted the jury to the potential
credibility problems of the witness; therefore, the jury could properly weigh
the credibility of the testimony. 482 The court did not conclude that Skorick's
substantial rights were affected by a single witness, on one topic, after
reviewing the entire record.
483
The court also found that no prosecutorial misconduct existed during
the State's rebuttal closing argument.484 The prosecutor's comments re-
garding the particular date merely clarified the dates expressed during
testimony.485 Therefore, no misconduct occurred. 486 The court found more
difficulty with the comments surrounding the physical evidence pre-
474. Id. T 18, 653 N.W.2d at 705.
475. Id.
476. Id. T 6, 653 N.W.2d at 701. The trial court's actions violated Rule 615 of the North
Dakota Rules of Evidence. Id. T 4. Rule 615 provides:
At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot
hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order on its own motion.
This rule does not authorize exclusion of (i) a party who is a natural person, or (ii) an
officer or employee of a party that is not a natural person designated as its representa-
tive by its attorney, or (iii) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential
to the presentation of the party's case. It is mandatory to exclude witness upon request
of either party.
N.D. R. EVID. 615. This rule includes rebuttal witnesses. N.D. R. EvID. 615 (citing State v. Hill,
1999 ND 26, T 6,590 N.W.2d 187).





482. Id. 9. A trial court's decision during trial is subject to an abuse of discretion standard.
Id. 5 8. The act must be arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable in order to be considered an
abuse of discretion. Id.
483. Id. T 7.
484. Id. 5 18, 653 N.W.2d at 705.
485. Id. T 13, 653 N.W.2d at 703-04.
486. Id.
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sented.487 Personal commentary during closing argument raises problems
because the attorney is not subject to cross-examination and may be con-
sidered an expert by the jury. 488 The prosecutors comment may have sig-
naled an expert opinion to the jury about what evidence is typical in sexual
imposition cases.489 This creates some worry because attorneys are not
allowed to create evidence by arguing personal beliefs.490 However, after
considering all of the evidence presented at trial, the court found no mis-
conduct. 491 Despite the concern for the prosecutor's comment, the jury was
instructed to weigh the evidence in its entirety and not to consider closing
arguments as evidence.4 92 After reviewing the evidence in its entirety, the
court held that the comments were not so offensive as to prejudice the
defendant. 493
CRIMINAL LAW-SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE-
ABANDONMENT-IDENTIFICATION
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA V. DUNN
Patrick Dunn filed a motion to suppress evidence in his criminal prose-
cution for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia.494 After a hear-
ing, the district court granted the motion to suppress based on Dunn's
Fourth Amendment rights.495 The State then appealed the order granting
Dunn's motion.496 The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed and af-
firmed the lower court's decision, holding that the search of Dunn's jacket
violated his right against unreasonable search and seizure.497
On February 23, 2002, a group of Fargo police officers were dis-
patched to investigate a report of a loud party and possible fights at a South
Fargo private residence.4 98 The officers found many vehicles parked on the
driveway and on the street around the private residence. 499 They also
noticed a black leather jacket lying on the side of the driveway. 500 Initially,




491. Id. 18, 653 N.W.2d at 705.
492. Id. T 17, 653 N.W.2d at 704.
493. Id. (citing City of Grand Forks v. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d 700, 704 (N.D. 1989)).
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the officers left the jacket alone and approached the door.50' They asked
the female who answered the door to send her visitors home. 502 While
waiting for the party to break up, one of the officers retrieved the black
jacket and searched through its pockets. 503 The search revealed a drug pipe
and a film canister containing what appeared to be marijuana. 504 When
Dunn exited the residence he was not wearing a coat, so the officers ques-
tioned whether he owned the jacket lying on the driveway. 505 Dunn first
denied the fact that he owned the jacket, but he quickly admitted its owner-
ship and was therefore charged with possession of marijuana and drug
paraphernalia. 506
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1,
section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures. 507 Under North Dakota case law, a search occurs when the
"government intrudes upon an individual's reasonable expectation of priva-
cy." 508 In order to properly search within an individual's reasonable priva-
cy expectation, the government must first obtain a search warrant or meet a
recognized exception. 509 When a warrant is not obtained and no exception
met, the evidence from that search has been obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.510 The exclusionary rule requires suppression of the evidence as the
proper remedy for an improper invasion on a person's privacy.511
On appeal, the State argued several reasons why the police search of
Dunn's jacket did not violate his Fourth Amendment expectation of priva-
cy. 512 First, the State pointed out that "[w]hile individuals have a constitu-
tional privacy interest in their personal property, a warrantless search or
seizure of personal property that has been abandoned does not violate the
Fourth Amendment." 513 The court considered the issue of abandonment a







507. Id. 5 4 (citing City of Fargo v. Steffan, 2002 ND 26, 8, 639 N.W.2d 482, 484).




512. See id. 55 6, 10, 653 N.W.2d at 691, 692 (establishing the State's arguments that the
search was proper because the jacket had either been abandoned or the police had a right to search
the jacket to determine the identification of its owner).
513. Id. 5 8, 653 N.W.2d at 692.
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whether there was sufficient evidence "fairly capable of supporting the trial
court's findings."514 In the present case, the officers knew there were many
people attending the party, yet they failed to question any of the guests
about the jacket's ownership in an attempt to determine whether the jacket
was lost or unclaimed.515 The district court specifically found the jacket not
be abandoned, with proper factual basis to support its conclusion. 516 There-
fore, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed that conclusion stating that
the "circumstances did not justify an inference that the jacket was stolen,
lost, or abandoned."517 The court concluded that the warrantless search of
Dunn's jacket was in violation of his privacy rights.5' 8
Secondly, the State argued that the police officers searched Dunn's
jacket in an attempt to identify the owner of the jacket.519 Thus, the search
fell within an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
and the evidence should be admissible.520 The State cited several cases in
support of its argument, but the court distinguished the facts of each case
from Dunn's situation.52' In each of the cases the State cited, the property
searched for identification had been lost or stolen, which created a situation
of abandonment. 522 Dunn's jacket, however, was not reported lost or
stolen, nor did the police conduct an inquiry to determine whether the jacket
514. Id. 13, 653 N.W.2d at 693.
515. Id. 9 9, 653 N.W.2d at 692.
516. Id.
517. Id.j 13,653 N.W.2d at 693.




522. Id. T5 10-12, 653 N.W.2d at 692-93. One of the cases cited by the State involved a
woman who was robbed of her purse. Id. 5 10 (citing U.S. v. Sumlin, 909 F.2d 1218, 1220 (8th
Cir. 1990)). An officer investigated the scene and found a purse that looked like the stolen purse.
Id. The officer then searched the purse to determine whether it belonged to the victim. Id.
During the search, the officer found a handgun and cocaine. Id. The court distinguished the facts
from Dunn because Dunn's jacket had not been claimed lost, nor was it found in an alley behind
the homeowner's property. Id. Since the jacket was in clear sight on the driveway of private
property, Dunn still had an expectation of privacy. Id.
The court also found that a briefcase sitting next to an overflowing trash bin on a busy city
street had been abandoned and that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed regarding the
briefcase. Id. 5 11 (citing U.S. v. O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1533 (11 th Cir. 1985).
The court also distinguished two Oregon cases. Id. 5 12, 653 N.W.2d at 693. In one, a
mother and daughter found a black leather briefcase by their mailbox. Id. (citing State v. Pidcock,
759 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Or. 1988)). The court found the search proper because the briefcase had
been abandoned. Id. In the other Oregon case, a defendant left a backpack at the scene of a bar
fight as he fled. Id. (citing State v. Belcher, 759 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Or. 1988)). The court found
that a search of the backpack was appropriate to identify its owner because it had been abandoned.
Id. In order for a search to be justified as a proper inquiry into the articles owner, there first must
be a proper investigation as to whether the article has been abandoned. Id.
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was unclaimed. 523 Therefore, the search did not fall outside of Dunn's
reasonable expectation of privacy and the Fourth Amendment protections
against unreasonable search and seizure.
524
The court relied on the district courts findings and held that there was
"sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's
findings." 525 The court found that the search of Dunn's jacket fell within
his privacy protections. 526 Since the search was not a permissible inspec-
tion to identify the owner of the property, the circumstances did not justify
a finding that the jacket was abandoned, and there was no claim the search
was conducted with probable cause, the search was found unconstitutional
and the motion to suppress upheld.527
FAMILY LAW-CHILD CUSTODY
IN THE INTEREST OF R.K., V. R.K., M.R., D.K. & GRANDPARENTS
In 1999, Don and Maria became the biological parents of a baby boy,
Robert.528 Although they were unmarried, Don and Maria lived together for
about a month after their son was born, at which time Don moved to Dick-
inson.529 Maria then assumed physical custody of Robert.530 Meanwhile,
Don got married and started a family with his new wife, Cathy.531 About a
year after Robert's birth, the Stutsman County Social Service Board con-
ducted several assessments on the minor child in order to investigate
possible neglect of the child.532 As a result, Social Services recommended
that Maria get parenting assistance and psychological and alcohol evalua-
tions.533 On August 12, 2001, the minor child was removed from Maria's
home and placed with Maria's parents. 534 Social Services thereafter
requested that the juvenile court find Robert to be a deprived child.535
Don appealed the court's decision and sought custody of the child
against the maternal grandparents. 536 In a child custody dispute, an award
523. Id. 10, 653 N.W.2d at 692.












536. Id. 5 5.
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of custody to a third party rather than to one or both of child's natural
parents is erroneous unless exceptional circumstances require that the child
be placed in custody of someone other than a parent to prevent serious harm
or detriment to the child's welfare.537 A finding of deprivation must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence.538
If a child is, in fact, found to be deprived, the court has two alternatives
pursuant to section 27-20-30 of the North Dakota Century Code.539 The
court can allow the child to stay with his or her parents, provided the parent
follows any guidelines the court sets forth, which may include court ordered
supervision. 540 The court can also transfer temporary legal custody to a
foster home, any other fit individual who is qualified to care for the child,
the director of the county social service board, or an individual in another
state with or without supervision by an appropriate officer.54'
The minor child's father was never accused of neglecting the child, so
he appealed the trial court's decision to place his son with his maternal
grandparents and not with him.5 42 Pursuant to section 27-20-01 of the
North Dakota Century Code, the Uniform Juvenile Court Act states that a
child should be separated from his natural parents only when necessary for
his or her welfare or in the interest of public safety.543 The court found that
exceptional circumstances did not exist in this case. 544 In fact, the Stark
County Social Service Board conducted a home study on Don's home and
found him to be fit and capable of providing proper care for his minor
child.545
Based on the particular circumstances presented in this case, the
Supreme Court held that placing a child found to be deprived while in their
mother's custody in the maternal grandparents' custody, without explaining
why child should not have been placed in father's custody, was errone-
ous. 546 The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order for removal
and remanded the matter for further proceedings. 47
537. Id. 5 9, 646 N.W.2d at 703 (citing Hamers v. Guttormson, 2000 ND 93, 5, 610
N.W.2d 758, 759-60).
538. Id. 6, 646 N.W.2d at 701.
539. Id. at 702 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-30 (1999)).
540. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-30).
541. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-30).
542. Id. 14, 646 N.W.2d at 703.
543. Id. 9, 646 N.W.2d at 702-03 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-01 (1991)).
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FAMILY LAW-DIVORCE
KNUTSON V. KNUTSON
In Knutson v. Knutson,548 Jacqueline Knutson appealed from the trial
court's order denying her motion to vacate the divorce decree entered upon
a stipulated settlement agreement. 549 Jacqueline Knutson filed a motion
with the district court seeking to vacate the judgment on the grounds that
the stipulated agreement between the parties was unconscionable and was
signed by her as a result of her husband's undue influence.550 The North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision denying
Jacqueline Knutson's motion to vacate the divorce judgment. 551 Justice
Maring concurred in part and dissented in part.552
Richard and Jacqueline Knutson were married in 1989.553 They have
one child, Ashley, who was born on March 26, 1990.554 Jacqueline Knut-
son filed for divorce on August 7, 2000.555 In November 2000, the parties
entered into a stipulated agreement that divided the marital property and
gave the parties joint physical and legal custody of Ashley.556 The agree-
ment stated that Ashley would spend equal amounts of time with Jacqueline
and Richard.557 Additionally, neither party would receive spousal support
or child support from the other party.55 8 The trial court dissolved the mar-
riage and set the terms of the divorce in accordance with the stipulation.559
Jacqueline Knutson thereafter filed a motion to vacate the divorce
decree with the trial court. 560 The trial court denied the motion to vacate
and Jacqueline appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.561 On appeal,
Jacqueline asserted that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her
motion to vacate the divorce degree because the decree was unconscionable
and that the signed stipulation that the divorce was based upon was signed
because of her husband's undue influence. 562
548. 2002 ND 29, 639 N.W.2d 495.
549. Knutson, 1, 639 N.W.2d at 497.
550. Id. 3.
551. Id. T 22, 639 N.W.2d at 502.
552. Id. T 24.
553. Id. 2, 639 N.W.2d at 497.
554. Id. at 497-98.









NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Jacqueline Knutson argued that she was under Richard Knutson's un-
due influence because she was suffering from depression at the time they
agreed to the stipulation. 563 According to Mrs. Knutson, Richard took ad-
vantage of her mental state by pressuring her to sign the stipulation.5
64
However, the trial court found that there was no evidence that Jacqueline
was suffering from depression at the time of the negotiations because she
was not taking any medications.5 65 Additionally, she retained an attorney
during the entire proceedings. 566 Mrs. Knutson's attorney advised her not
to sign the stipulation because although the property divisions were fair,
there were no provisions for her to receive spousal support and because the
parties would have joint physical custody of Ashley.567 However, Mrs.
Knutson signed the stipulation agreement despite her attorney's advice. 568
The trial court determined that because Jacqueline had a degree in business
and had experience maintaining records for businesses, she was capable of
understanding the ramifications of the settlement agreement. 569 The trial
court also concluded that although Jacqueline Knutson's signing of the
agreement was not entirely free from duress by Richard Knutson, his pur-
pose and will had not been substituted for Mrs. Knutson's purpose and
will. 570
Jacqueline Knutson also asserted that the divorce decree was uncon-
scionable and should have been vacated because she did not receive spousal
support in the divorce.57 ' However, the trial court found that due to the fact
Mrs. Knutson had an estimated income of $40,000 in 2001 and she received
property worth over $500,000 in the divorce decree, the settlement agree-
ment was not so one-sided that no rational person would agree to its
terms. 572 Additionally, the trial court found that the distribution of the
property and the waiver of spousal support were not unconscionable. 573
The court distinguished the case at hand from Crawford v. Crawford,574
where the court held that a divorce judgment should be vacated because the






569. Id. 5 12, 639 N.W.2d at 500.
570. Id. 5 13.
571. Id. 5 14.
572. Id.
573. Id. T16, 639 N.W.2d at 501.
574. 524 N.W.2d 833 (N.D. 1994).
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wife was not awarded spousal support.575 The court pointed out that in
Crawford, Mr. Crawford made $130,000 per year and Mrs. Crawford only
made $300 per month, so despite an equal split of property, the stipulation
was unconscionable.576 Mrs. Knutson earns significantly more than $300
per month and received a substantial property settlement. 577
Jacqueline Knutson also asserted that the stipulation agreement should
be set aside because the provision awarding the parties joint physical cus-
tody and the provision awarding neither party child support were uncon-
scionable. 578 Although the trial court acknowledged that it is not generally
in the best interests of the child to be traded back and forth, because Ashley
was thriving, the rotating custody arrangement was acceptable. 579 Addi-
tionally, because the child support guidelines do not address the situation
where parents jointly share custody, the trial court need only make an order
appropriate to the needs of the child and the abilities of the parents to pay
for child support.SO
The court can set aside a judgment for fraud, misrepresentation, mis-
conduct of an adverse party, or for any other reason justifying relief under
Rule 60(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. 581 A trial court's
decision to deny relief under this rule will not be overturned unless the trial
court abuses its discretion. 582 A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts
in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or is not the product
of a rational mental process. 583
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings
that the stipulation was not the result of undue influence and was not un-
conscionable were reasonable. According to the court, even though Jacque-
line Knutson may have received more favorable terms if she had followed
her attorney's advice, the terms of the divorce decree were not so blatant
and one-sided that they should be unenforceable. Because the terms of the
stipulation were reasonable, the court held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Jacqueline Knutson's motion to vacate the divorce
decree. 584
575. Knutson v. Knutson, 2002 ND 29, T 15, 639 N.W.2d 495, 500.
576. Id.
577. Id. T 14.
578. Id. T 17, 639 N.W.2d at 501.
579. Id. T 19, 639 N.W.2d at 502.
580. Id. T 20.
581. Id. T 6,639 N.W.2d at 498.
582. Id. T 7.
583. Id.
584. Id. T 21, 639 N.W.2d at 502.
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Justice Maring concurred in part and dissented in part. 585 Justice
Maring agreed with the majority that neither the lack of spousal support nor
the custody arrangement was unconscionable. 586 However, Justice Maring
disagreed with the majority's opinion that the trial court concluded that
Jacqueline Knutson had not been coerced; the lower court actually found
that Mrs. Knutson was distraught during the proceedings and she may have
agreed to the stipulation because of Richard's coercive behavior.587 Ac-
cording to Justice Maring, because the trial court's opinion was unclear as
to whether or not Mrs. Knutson's signing of the stipulation was a result. of
coercion on the part of Richard Knutson, the case should be reversed and
remanded back to the trial court to clarify its findings and conclusions of
law.588
INSURANCE LAW-EFFICIENT PROXIMATE CAUSE DOCTRINE
WESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. V. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA
Western National Insurance Company (Western National) appealed a
declaratory judgment.589 The judgment awarded the University of North
Dakota (UND) $3,358,533.18, plus prejudgment interest, costs, and attor-
ney fees, for property damage relating to massive flooding and sewer back-
up in April of 1997.590 On April 19, 1997, the City of Grand Forks and the
UND campus were ordered to evacuate.591 UND claimed that twenty-two
buildings on its campus were damaged by sewer back up as a result of the
City of Grand Forks' decision to take lift stations twelve and six offline.592
Following this decision, water entered the UND buildings through the sew-
er system and caused extensive property damage to boiler and machinery
,equipment in the buildings.593
At that time, UND had a boiler and machinery policy issued by
Western National, which provided coverage for "direct damage to Covered
Property caused by a Covered Cause of Loss" but excluded coverage for
"loss or damage caused directly or indirectly" by flood "regardless of any
other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the
585. Id. J 24.
586. Id.
587. Id. 27, 639 N.W.2d at 503.
588. Id.
589. W. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D., 2002 ND 63, 1, 643 N.W.2d 4, 7.
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lOSS." 594 UND claimed the damage to the boiler and machinery was due to
the sewer backup, which was not specifically excluded from coverage under
the boiler and machinery policy. 595 Western National refused coverage
claiming the damage to UND's boiler and machinery was excluded because
of the policy language stated above.596 On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the trial court decided the policy excluded coverage caused by
flood but did not exclude coverage for sewer backup.597
According to the lower court, sections 26.1-32-01 and 26.1-32-03 of
the North Dakota Century Code set out the "efficient proximate cause doc-
trine for resolving cases involving concurrent causes of property damage
where one cause is a covered peril and the other cause is an excluded
peril." 598 The lower court bifurcated the trial, and the jury decided the ef-
ficient proximate cause of UND's property damage was not the flood and
awarded UND over $3.3 million plus prejudgment interest but found
Western National had not acted in bad faith.599
Western National argued the loss incurred by UND was "unambigu-
ously excluded coverage" and that as a matter of law, the April 1997 flood
was the sole and direct cause of UND's property damage. 600 It argued that
the flood caused Grand Forks to shut down lift stations six and twelve,
which caused sewer backup that caused UND's property damage. 601
Western National argued that the trial court erred in applying the statute's
efficient proximate cause doctrine rather than enforcing the concurrent
cause language provided in the policy. 602
The supreme court held that "[e]xclusions from coverage in an
insurance policy must be clear and explicit, and are strictly construed
against the insurer." 60 3 The court further held that the policy did not,
explicitly define flood and did not explicitly exclude coverage for sewer
backup.6O4 Accordingly, the court relied on the plain and ordinary meaning
of the word flood and held that a flood is, "an overflowing of water on an
594. Id. 1 3, 643 N.W.2d at 8.
595. Id.
596. Id.
597. Id. 5 4.
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Id. 5 6.
601. Id.
602. Id.
603. Id. 5 7, 643 N.W.2d at 9 (citing Fisher v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 1998 ND 109, 5 6,
579 N.W.2d 599, 602).
604. Id. 9.
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area normally dry." 605  As to the sewer backup, the court concurrently
found that "[i]nsurance law generally recognizes sewer backup as a peril
that is separate and distinct from flood or surface water."60 6
Western National argued that whether it was sewer backup or flood
water that damaged UND's boilers was irrelevant because the flood water
of the Red River and English Coulee entered the sanitary sewage system
directly as a result of the flooding and caused the backup- the two were
inexorably linked.607 However, the court noted that,
Although the 1997 flood may have been part of the chain of causation
that contributed to UND's property damage, there was evidence the water
that damaged UND's property backed up through the sewer system and
contained sewage particulate. There was evidence no overland flooding
entered any of the twenty-two buildings in which UND claimed property
damage. 608
The court concluded that even though the magnitude of the water sug-
gested the flood may have been part of the chain of causation, the evidence
did not require as a matter of law the lower court to hold the flood was the
sole or direct cause of UND's property damage.609
Western National went on to argue that the "concurrent cause" lan-
guage of UND's policy specifically excluded coverage for damage caused
"directly or indirectly by flood," regardless of any other cause. 610 In order
to make a ruling on this policy language, the court was required to examine
the efficient proximate cause doctrine outlined in sections 26.1-32-01 and
26.1-32-03 of the North Dakota Century Code.61' The court relied heavily
on California cases interpreting that state's efficient proximate cause
doctrine, which is similar to the one found in North Dakota.612
Under California law, property insurers may not contract out of the
efficient proximate cause doctrine, and the court refused to adopt Western
National's interpretation that California employed the reasonable
605. Id. 5 10 (quoting WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 535 (2nd Coll. Ed. 1980)).
606. Id. (citations omitted).




611. Id. The first statute provides, "An insurer is liable for a loss proximately caused by a
peril insured against even though a peril not contemplated by the insurance contract may have
been a remote cause of the loss. An insurer is not liable for a loss of which the peril insured
against was only a remote cause." N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-32-01 (2002). The second statute
provides, "When a peril is excepted specially in an insurance contract, a loss which would not
have occurred but for that peril is excepted although the immediate cause of the loss was a peril
which was not excepted." N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-32-03 (2002).
612. W. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D., 2002 ND 63, 5 13,643 N.W.2d 4, 11.
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expectation doctrine. 613 California's interpretation of its statutorily pro-
vided efficient proximate cause doctrine was persuasive and the court held
that an insurer may not contractually preclude coverage when the efficient
proximate cause of a loss is a covered peril.614
Most significantly, the court determined that the efficient proximate
cause was a factual issue to be determined by the trier of fact.615 Western
National then argued that even if the efficient proximate cause doctrine
applied, the evidence established that the flood was the efficient proximate
cause of the property damage.616 The court held that there was sufficient
evidence to render a decision that the sewer backup was the efficient
proximate cause of the damage. 617
The court went on to reject Western National's assertion that the trial
court erred in denying its motion for a new trial based upon respondent
counsel's reference to reinsurance, the trial court's refusal to exclude
UND's expert opinion testimony that Western claims was not disclosed
during discovery, and the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury as to
proximate cause.618 The court also affirmed the lower court's award of
prejudgment interest.619 Additionally, the court upheld the awarding of
UND's attorney fees based on prior decisions allowing an insured to
recover attorney fees in litigation to resolve insurance coverage disputes. 620
MEDICAID
GREY BEAR V. NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
Delano Grey Bear and Robert V. Bolinske, his attorney, appealed the
trial court's dismissal of Grey Bear's claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and governmental bad faith and the trial court's awarding
to the North Dakota Department of Human Services (Department) of the
proceeds of a medical settlement received by Grey Bear.621 The North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Grey Bear's claim and the
613. Id. 5 16, 643 N.W.2d at 12 (citing Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr.
708, 711 (1990)).
614. Id. 5 19, 643 N.W.2d at 13.
615. Id. T 32, 643 N.W.2d at 15.
616. Id. 529.
617. Id. 33, 643 N.W.2d at 15-16.
618. Id. 5 35-43, 643 N.W.2d at 16-18.
619. Id. 5 46, 643 N.W.2d at 18 (citing Dolajak v. State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters, 278
N.W.2d 373, 383 (N.D. 1979)).
620. Id. 5 49, 643 N.W.2d at 19 (citations omitted).
621. Grey Bear v. N.D. Dept. of Human Services, 2002 ND 139, 5 1,651 N.W.2d 611,613.
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award reimbursement from Grey Bear. However, it reversed the award
against Bolinske.622
Grey Bear was paralyzed in a car accident in 1978, and in order to
receive Medicaid benefits from the Department, Grey Bear assigned any
rights of recovery against any third party to the Department. 623 In 1998,
Grey Bear settled a medical malpractice claim out of which Bolinske was
paid one-third, and the Department and Grey Bear equally split the
remaining monies. 624 Though Grey Bear had pursued the claim without as-
sistance from the Department, the Department demanded all of the pro-
ceeds, minus attorney fees and expenses, based on the Medicaid assignment
Grey Bear had signed.625 Grey Bear then sued the Department for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress and governmental bad faith, claiming
he was entitled to all of the proceeds. 626
Grey Bear's argument was that he had only assigned the proceeds of
any claim for medical costs and therefore the Department's award should be
limited to medical costs and should not represent any part of the settlement
awarded for pain and suffering. 627 After Grey Bear filed his claim, the
Department argued that it was entitled to all of the proceeds, minus attorney
fees and expenses, and filed an amended counterclaim adding Bolinske as a
party. 628 The court granted the Department summary judgment on all
claims.629 Bolinske moved for reconsideration based on a lack of personal
jurisdiction over him; however, the court denied the motion and signed the
judgment. 630 Bolinske then moved for a vacation of the judgment against
him, which the trial court granted and the judge recused himself.631 The
case was reassigned, and after review, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Department and this appeal followed.632
622. Id.
623. Id. 5 2. The assignment was pursuant to section 50-24.1-02.1of the North Dakota
Century Code. Id. T 6, 651 N.W.2d at 614 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-24.1-02.1 (1999)).
624. Id. 3, 651 N.W.2d at 613. The surgical procedure that caused the complications
resulting in the malpractice suit was paid for by the Department. Id.
625. Id.
626. Id. 4.
627. Id. 6, 651 N.W.2d at 614.
628. Id. 4, 651 N.W.2d at 613-14. The Department added Bolinske in the counterclaim
alleging that Grey Bear and Bolinske conspired to convert the Department's money. Id. at 614.
629. Id.
630. Id. 55 5, 27, 651 N.W.2d at 614, 621. Bolinske claimed that the court did not have
personal jurisdiction over him because he was not served with notice. Id. 5, 651 N.W.2d at 614.
631. Id. The judge based his recusal on a concern that he had developed personal bias
against Bolinske due to irritation with Bolinske's tactics. Id.
632. Id.
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The court reviewed the legislative purpose of Medicaid and determined
that Medicaid was intended to be a payor of last resort for medical costs.
633
As such, the state agency administering the program is required to have
Medicaid recipients assign the rights to reimbursement from any third party
for medical care to the state. 634 After reviewing the legislative history, case
law, and other states' statutes, the court concluded that the assignment
statute should be interpreted broadly.635 The court then determined that all
of the proceeds from the settlement should be available to the state; how-
ever, the court limited the Department's right of recovery to the amount
expended for the care and treatment of the Medicaid recipient. 636 The court
rejected Grey Bear's alternative argument that the Department gave up its
right to the settlement because it did not pursue the malpractice claim.
637
The court also affirmed that Grey Bear was personally responsible for reim-
bursing the Department the funds that the insurance company paid him in
settlement of his claim. 638
The original award to the Department was $30,000 minus a twenty per-
cent attorney fee ($6,000) and $2,656.34 in expenses, less any amounts paid
to the Department. 639 Grey Bear repeatedly protested the expense award,
and the trial court granted, the objection while noting that it was not in Grey
Bear's favor.640 After Grey Bear and Bolinske realized the error, they
moved for an amendment to reinclude the expense award, but the court
denied the motion. 641 The court explained that the trial judge had acted
properly in the face of Grey Bear's "vigorous and persistent" efforts to
amend the original award in the face of contrary advice and explanations.
642
633. Id. 5 8,651 N.W.2d at 614-15.
634. Id. "The Medicaid program is governed by the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-
1396(v)." Id. at 614. The Medicaid program is funded by federal and state monies. Id.
635. Id. 5 10, 651 N.W.2d at 615. District Judge Bekken disagreed with such a broad
interpretation of the assignment statute. Id. T 36, 651 N.W.2d at 622 (Bekken, D.J., concurring).
636. Id. 5 14, 651 N.W.2d at 617 (determining that the assignment statute included a right to
recover costs even if they were part of a recovery representing pain and suffering benefits).
637. Id. 15, 651 N.W.2d at 618 (explaining that the State was entitled to collect from a




640. Id. 55 19, 20, 651 N.W.2d at 618-19. The judge explained to Grey Bear that by con-
testing the payment of the expense award from the Department's award, he was decreasing the
reimbursement to Bolinske. Id. Jr 20, 651 N.W.2d at 619.
641. Id. 5 22, 651 N.W.2d at 619-20 (noting that Bolinske "failed to diligently protect his
own interests by continuous failure to read the pleadings, orders and judgments").
642. Id. at 620.
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Grey Bear also appealed the twenty percent award of attorney fees as
unjust and unreasonable. 643 The Department notified Bolinske during the
trial of Grey Bear's assignment and that there was a schedule of attorney
fees under the assignment. 644 The court noted the Department's authority to
establish an attorney fee schedule under the assignment statute and was
unpersuaded by Grey Bear's claim. 645
On appeal, Bolinske argued that the court did not have personal juris-
diction over him and that any judgment against him was null and void.646
The Department argued that Bolinske had waived jurisdictional defects.647
After reviewing the record, the court determined that Bolinske had invoked
all defenses under Rule 12(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.648 The court noted that although Bolinski acted for Grey Bear, the
only time he subjected himself personally to the court's jurisdiction was
when he requested an extension of time in responding to the Department's
counterclaim and reply. 649 The court noted that such a request does not
necessarily constitute a waiver of jurisdictional defects.650 The court con-
cluded that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Bolinske and
reversed the judgment against him.651
Both Justice Maring and District Judge Bekken wrote separate concur-
rences, joining each other's opinion but expressing disagreement about
different portions of the majority's opinion.652 Judge Bekken did not agree
that the assignment under section 50-24.1-02.1 of the North Dakota Century
Code should have included the settlement damages received for pain and
643. Id. 5 23. Grey Bear and Bolinske had agreed upon attorney fees of thirty-three percent.
Id.
644. Id. 25. Fees for attorney services under the assignment statute are based on the form
of recovery. Id. 5 26 (citing N.D. Cent. Code § 50-24.1-04 (1999)).
645. Id. 26.
646. Id. T 27, 651 N.W.2d at 621. Bolinske argued that there was lack of personal
jurisdiction under North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4 because of insufficiency of
service of process and insufficiency of process. Id.
647. Id. 5 28. The Department argued that Rule 4(b)(4) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure provided an alternative to actual service of process. Id. It was uncontested that there
was no actual service of process on Bolinske in this matter. Id. 5 29. Rule 4(b)(4) allows a court
to acquire personal jurisdiction over a person if they voluntarily make a general appearance in the
action themselves or through their attorney. Id. 5 28. (citing N.D. R CIV. P. 4(b)(4).
648. Id. 5 31. When replying to the Department's counterclaim, Bolinske answered that all
Rule 12(b) defenses of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure applied to the counterclaim. Id.
649. Id. If 32.
650. Id. at 622. The court distinguished this case from Opp v. Matzke, where the court found
that the defendant made a voluntary general appearance when the defendant submitted an
affidavit, counsel made an appearance for him, and the defendant participated in preparation of
interrogatories. Id. at 621-22 (Opp v. Matzke, 1997 ND 32,55 16-17, 559 N.W.2d 837, 841).
651. Id.
652. Id. 1 36, 44, 651 N.W.2d at 622, 624 (Bekken, D.J. and Maring, J., concurring).
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suffering as part of the recoupable medical costs. 653 He would have inter-
preted the statute narrowly and limited the assignment to actual medical
costs recovered. 654 Though disagreeing with the majority's interpretation of
the assignment statute, Bekken agreed with the grant of summary judgment
because no disputed issue of material fact was presented.655
Justice Maring did not agree with a statement made by the majority in
dicta that whether or not the insurance company was notified of the assign-
ment it did not affect whether Grey Bear was personally responsible for
reimbursing the Department. 656 Maring explained that had the insurance
company been notified of the assignment, not only would they have been
required to make the payment directly to the Department but they should
have been included in any settlement discussions.657 Justice Maring noted,
however, that Grey Bear did not establish that the insurance company was
notified; therefore, her explanation was for clarification purposes only. 658
Justice Maring supported District Judge Bekken's concurrence by noting a
recent Minnesota decision in which the Minnesota Supreme Court con-
cluded that broadly interpreting a state's assignment rights under Medicaid
interfered with the objectives of the Federal Medicaid plan. 659
PROPERTY-LANDLORD AND TENANT-EVICTION
ANDERSON V. HEINZE
Kenneth Heinze appealed a trial court decision evicting him from
property he had been leasing from Donald Anderson.660 The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, stating that after the
expiration of his lease, Heinze had no right of possession to the property.661
On February 1, 2000, Heinze and Anderson had entered into an agree-
ment granting Heinze a one-year lease to some of Anderson's property. 662
653. Id. 5 37, 651 N.W.2d at 622.
654. Id. (explaining that he would apply the terms "for medical costs incurred" to the
preceding words, not the entire sentence as the majority had).
655. Id. 5 41, 651 N.W.2d at 623 (noting that because Grey Bear did not establish how much,
if any, of the award was for pain and suffering, there was no dispute established regarding the
Department's claim for the entire amount).
656. Id. 44, 651 N.W.2d at 624.
657. Id.
658. Id.
659. Id. T 46 (citing Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Minn. 2002)). The
Federal Medicaid plan has dual objectives-protection of the recipient's limited assets from the
State and providing for recovery from third parties to cover recipient's medical expenses. Id. at
624-25.
660. Anderson v. Heinze, 2002 ND 60, 5 7, 643 N.W.2d 24, 27.
661. Id. 15 14-15, 643 N.W.2d at 28.
662. Id. 5 2, 643 N.W.2d at 25-26.
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The agreement provided that the lease would expire on the following
February or upon the sale of the land by the lessor, and that if such sale
were to occur, the lessee would have the first option and right of first
refusal on the purchase of the land. 663 In addition, the lease provided that
upon the expiration of the lease agreement, Heinze would quietly surrender
and vacate the property.664 In June 2000, Anderson died, survived by his
wife, Rosalia, who acquired the property. 665 On November 22, 2000,
Rosalia's attorney advised Heinze that Rosalia was looking to sell the land
he was currently leasing.666 Her attorney also advised Heinze that Rosalia
was asking $275,000, and if he wanted to exercise his first option and right
of first refusal he had to do so in writing prior to December 15, 2000; if he
did not exercise his rights, the land would be sold in January 2001.667
On December 28, 2000, Rosalia's attorney provided Heinze with a
copy of an advertisement soliciting written bids for the property, which
could be raised orally on January 29, 2001.668 In addition, Heinze was ad-
vised that if he was not the highest bidder, he was to have his possessions
removed from the premises by the middle of March unless arrangements
were made with the new owner. 669 The attorney again notified Heinze by
letter on January 10, 2001 that Heinze had a right to submit a bid at the
auction and that he would be allowed to match any bid offered at that time,
but if he was outbid, he would have to vacate the premises by March
l5th.670 Although Heinze had submitted the highest written bid, he was
subsequently outbid at the auction.671
When March 15, 2001 arrived, Heinze had not vacated the premises,
nor had he made arrangements with the new owner to remain on the
premises. 672 Approximately two weeks later, Heinze was served with a
notice of intention to evict and notice to quit, which gave Heinze three days
to get off the property or be subject to eviction.673 Heinze was subsequently
served with a summons and complaint commencing an eviction action
when he failed to vacate the premises. 674 After the trial court held several
663. Id. at 26.
664. Id.
665. Id. 5 3.
666. Id.
667. Id.




672. Id. T 5.
673. Id.
674. Id. 5 5, 643 N.W.2d at 26-27.
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hearings on the matter, it issued a memorandum decision denying all of
Heinze's motions and claims and entered a judgment granting the eviction
sought by the plaintiffs.675 Heinze appealed.
676
On appeal, Heinze argued that the trial court abused its discretion by
not allowing him to cross-examine witnesses at the April 17th hearing and
"by recommending a multiplicity of actions and not recognizing resolution
in a single lawsuit." 677 As to his first argument, the court noted that Heinze
never attempted to cross-examine any witnesses at the hearing, nor did he
request to do so. 678 When reviewing Heinze's second argument, the court
looked to section 33-06-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, which al-
lows for an eviction action when a lessee holds over after the expiration or
termination of a lease.679 Under chapter 33-06 of the North Dakota Century
Code, an eviction action is treated as a summary proceeding to recover
possession to real estate, and it provides for an expedited time period in
which the defendant must appear to defend against such an action. 680
Because the eviction action is summary in nature, no counterclaims are per-
mitted except setoff to a demand for damages or rents. 68 1 Therefore the
right to possession is the only claim that can be litigated on behalf of a
defendant unless damages or rents are claimed.
682
Because Heinze raised issues that were either not briefed on appeal or
were not counterclaims pled as setoffs to the plaintiff's claim for damages,
they were not remedied by the court.683 The court noted that Heinze could
have raised such issues in a separate proceeding because they were not
suitable for disposition in an eviction action.684 As a result, the court af-
firmed the trial court's decision to evict Heinze from the premises, stating
that he no longer had a right to possession after the expiration of the
lease.68 5
675. Id. 5 7, 643 N.W.2d at 27.
676. Id.
677. Id. ST 8-9.
678. Id. 5 8.
679. Id. 1 10 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 33-06-01 (2002)).
680. Id. T 11, 643 N.W.2d at 28.
681. Id. (quoting Nomland Motor Co. v. Alger, 39 N.W.2d 899, 900 (N.D. 1949)).
682. Id. (quoting Vidger v. Nolin, 87 N.W. 593 (N.D. 1901)).
683. Id. T5 12-13.
684. Id. T 13.
685. Id. 14.
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW-DISABILITY 'AND VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION BENEFITS
HOFFMAN V. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION BUREAU
After a district court affirmed the decision by North Dakota Workers'
Compensation Bureau to terminate his disability and vocational rehabilita-
tion benefits, Mark Hoffman appealed to the North Dakota Supreme
Court.686 Justice Neumann, writing for the court, reversed and remanded
the decision back to the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau.
687
Chief Justice VandeWalle, Justice Maring, and Judge Bekken joined Justice
Neumann's opinion.688 Justice Sandstrom dissented.689
In 1993, Mark Hoffman was working as a lineman for Mor-Gran-Sou
Electric Cooperative in Flasher, North Dakota when he injured his lower
back on the job.690 The North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau
(Bureau) accepted liability and awarded Hoffman medical expenses and
disability benefits associated to his injury.691 In 1996, the Bureau began a
vocational rehabilitation program for Hoffman. 692 Based on Hoffman's
doctor's opinion, he was restricted to "light level work." 693 When the
Bureau scheduled Hoffman a vocation rehabilitation program at Bismarck
State College (BSC) starting June 5, 1999, in order to become a computer
support specialist, his doctor approved the training program.
694
Hoffman's benefits were suspended and thereafter reinstated in 1999
and 2000 for noncompliance with the order for vocational rehabilitation.
695
In 1999, his benefits were suspended because he failed to register for
classes at BSC.696 However, because Hoffman was still under probation at
North Dakota State University from 1970, the Bureau found good cause for
Hoffman's noncompliance and reinstated his benefits. 697 After being
reinstated, the Bureau allowed Hoffman to take his required courses over
the Internet from his home. 698 In 2000, Hoffman's benefits were once again
686. Hoffman v. N. D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 2002 ND 138, J1,651 N.W.2d 601, 602.
687. Id.
688. Id. J 23, 651 N.W.2d at 609.
689. Id. 24.





695. Id. 3-4, 651 N.W.2d at 602-03.
696. Id. 3,651 N.W.2d at 602.
697. Id.
698. Id. at 603.
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suspended because he had not met the academic requirements of his
vocational rehabilitation. 699
Then, in April of 2000, Hoffman saw Dr. Krause and complained that
he was unable to sit in front of his computer for long periods of time
because it bothered his back. 700 Dr. Krause indicated in her notes that Hoff-
man had consistently told her that his back bothered him.7 01 Additionally
she noted that she had never seen him sit for long periods of time during an
examination; 02 rather, he usually stood or paced.70 3 She recommended that
he cut down his course work to two classes per semester and have a physi-
cal therapist visit his home to make his computer area more comfortable.
704
Although Hoffman failed all four of his classes that semester, the Bureau
did not terminate his benefits because Dr. Krause had recommended limit-
ing his classes to two per semester. 05 However, the Bureau did require him
to attend a summer class. 706 After the physical therapist visited Hoffman's
home and made adjustments to his study area, Hoffman still complained of
back pain. 707
Dr. Krause recommended that Hoffman undergo a functional capacity
evaluation (FCE) in June of 2000.708 After Hoffman underwent the FCE,
the physical therapist reported that the test was inaccurate because Hoffman
did not give a maximum consistent effort during the evaluation and that he
appeared to be unable or willing to do so. 709 The physical therapist also
noted that "significant pain behaviors were an interfering factor" with the
FCE.710 Dr. Krause then determined that Hoffman's chronic back pain was
exacerbated by the FCE.711
Hoffman failed his summer course, bringing his grade point average
below the minimum requirement of 2.0.712 Because of this, the Bureau
issued another order terminating disability payments and vocational
rehabilitation on September 27, 2000. 7 13 At the evidentiary hearing, Dr.
699. Id.T4.








708. Id. 5 7.
709. Id.
710. Id. at 603-04.
711. Id. at 604.
712. Id. T 8.
713. Id.
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Krause testified that Hoffman's back pain limited him from performing
many daily activities and that, in her opinion, he was not malingering or
exaggerating his pain. 714 The chairman of the computer office technology
department at BSC also testified at the evidentiary hearing.715 He stated
that the summer school class that Hoffman failed was actually the equiva-
lent of two courses, and due to Hoffman's lack of basic keyboarding skills,
Hoffman would actually spend more than twenty to twenty-five hours a
week on the course.716 Despite this evidence, the administrative law judge
determined that Hoffman had failed to comply with the vocational
rehabilitation requirements without good cause for a second time.717 The
Bureau adopted the administrative law judge's recommendations and the
district court affirmed the decision. 718
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the
administrative law judge's decision.719 The court will affirm the agency's
decision unless the conclusions of law are not supported by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, its conclusions of law are not supported by its
findings of fact, its final decision is not supported by conclusions of law, its
decision is not in accordance with the law, or the decision violates the
claimant's constitutional rights.720 Upon review of an administrative
agency's findings of fact, the standard the court uses is whether a reasoning
mind could have determined the evidence supported the findings.721
At the administrative hearing, the Workers' Compensation Bureau had
the burden of showing that Hoffman did not comply with the rehabilitation
plan. 722 Once the Bureau showed noncompliance, the burden of proof
shifted to the claimant to show good cause for the noncompliance. 723
Hoffman argued that willful failure to give a consistent effort at a FCE
cannot be deemed an act of noncompliance under section 65-05.1-04(6) of
the North Dakota Century Code because noncompliance should only apply





718. Id. 12, 651 N.W.2d at 605.
719. Id. J 13.
720. Id.
721. Id.
722. Id. J 15, 651 N.W.2d at 606.
723. Id.
724. Id. 1 20. Section 65-05.1-04(6) of the North Dakota Century Codes states in relevant
part: If without good cause, the injured employee fails to attend specific vocational testing,
remedial or other vocational services determined necessary by the bureau or the rehabilitative
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rejected this argument, however, stating that Hoffman's interpretation of the
statute led to an absurd and ludicrous result.725 The court stated that the
word "attend" clearly indicated that the claimant must not only attend the
FCE, but also must give a maximum consistent effort.726
However, the court's final determination was in Hoffman's favor.727 It
held that the Bureau failed to consider evidence favorable to Hoffman.728
Therefore, a reasonable mind could not have found that Hoffman's
noncompliance lacked good cause.729 The Bureau should have considered
Dr. Krause's testimony because it was the only medical evidence pre-
sented.730 Dr. Krause's testimony that Hoffman could only take two classes
at a time in conjunction with the chairman's testimony that the summer
course was actually more than the equivalent of one course indicated that
Hoffman was unable to comply with the Bureau's requirements only
because of medical restrictions, not because he was unwilling. 731
Based on the determination that Hoffman was unable to meet the
Bureau's requirements rather than unwilling to meet the requirements, the
court reversed the judgment of the administrative law judge and remanded
the case to the Bureau for further proceedings. 732 Justice Sandstrom
dissented. 733 Because a reasoning mind could had determined from the
Bureau's findings that the weight of the evidence showed that Hoffman did
not have good cause for his noncompliance with the rehabilitation plan,
Justice Sandstrom opined that the Bureau's decision should had been
affirmed.734
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW-STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
WANNER V. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION BUREAU
Marvin Wanner appealed a district court decision affirming an
administrative law judge's (ALJ) recommendation in favor of the North
Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau (Bureau). 735
consultant, the employee is in non-compliance with vocational rehabilitation. N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-05.1-04(6) (1995).
725. Hoffman v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 2002 ND 138, T 21, 651 N.W.2d 601, 606.
726. Id. at 609.
727. Id. T 22.
728. Id.
729. Id.
730. Id. l 19, 651 N.W.2d at 608.
731. Id.
732. Id. T 22, 651 N.W.2d at 609.
733. Id. T 25 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
734. Id. T 36, 651 N.W.2d at 611.
735. Wanner v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2002 ND 201, T 1,654 N.W.2d 760, 763.
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On September 20, 1988, Wanner injured his back while employed as a
truck driver.736 The Bureau accepted liability and paid medical expenses
and disability benefits. 737 In 1999, the Bureau conducted surveillance on
Wanner by way of a private investigator to determine whether information
they received, claiming that Wanner was doing physical labor, was
correct. 738 Through the investigation, the Bureau determined that Wanner
was maintaining a garden from which he was receiving money for
vegetables and that he was also helping a friend with harvest activities,
without pay, all while receiving his disability benefits. 739 The Bureau
claimed that since Wanner had failed to report these activities, he had
willfully made false statements and should repay $6,678.51 of his past
benefits and forfeit all additional workers' compensation benefits. 740
Wanner requested a rehearing. 741 After the hearing, an ALJ found that
"it is clear that for the work done in his garden Wanner would not think that
he had gone back to work or even done any type of work.... Regardless,
he was unequivocally instructed and advised by the Bureau concerning the
completion of the report that he 'must report any money received from
work, activities, or services of any kind, regardless of profit or loss."' 742
The ALJ concluded that since the Bureau's instructions and advice
section in the questionnaire included the statement "work of any kind
(voluntary, part-time, or full time) that you do, whether you are paid or
not," Wanner willfully made a false statement within the meaning of
section 65-05-33 of the North Dakota Century Code in connection with his
workers' compensation benefits claim. 743 The ALJ found that Wanner did
not have to reimburse the Bureau for benefits that they had already paid
him, but stated that he would forfeit any additional benefits.744
Section 65-05-33 is concerned with false statements used to secure
benefits, the failure to report income from work, the failure to notify the
Bureau of work, and other activities as required under section 65-05-
08(3).745 This statute states that any employee who is receiving disability





740. Id. 55 2-3.
741. Id. 3.
742. Id. at 763-64.
743. Id. TJ 5, 654 N.W.2d at 764.
744. Id. at 765-66.
745. Id. 1 15, 654 N.W.2d at 767.
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from any source. 746 It continues by stating that if the employee willfully
fails to report wages earned, the employee is subject to penalties. 747 The
statute concludes by defining the word "work" as not including "routine
daily activities of self-care or family care, or routine maintenance of the
home and yard."7 48
When the North Dakota Supreme Court hears an appeal from an
administrative agency decision, it reviews the decision of the agency and
not that of the district court.749 The court only decides whether a reasoning
mind reasonably could have decided that the agency's findings were proved
by the weight of the evidence from the entire record.750
Wanner's main contention was that the Bureau erred when it found he
willfully made false statements in regards to receipt of money for his
vegetable garden and helping on a family friend's farm. 751 Wanner based
his contention around the definition of "work." If the Bureau concluded
that his activities were not "work," then their argument that he willfully
failed to report income from work was not supported by the evidence and
was contrary to the law.752
The court stated that to qualify for the statutory consequences for a
false claim or statement, the Bureau must prove that Wanner willfully made
a material false claim or statement regarding his claim.753 As to willfulness,
the court explained that the conduct must be intentional, not inadvertent. 754
The court found that the Bureau could have reasonably concluded that
Wanner willfully made a false statement within the meaning of the
statute. 755
Wanner further argued that the false statement in question did not rise
to the level of materiality that would justify forfeiture of future benefits. 756
The Bureau responded that since the statement Wanner made could have
misled the Bureau's determination of Wanner's options for rehabilitation
and entitlement to benefits, it was material. 757 The court held that Wanner's




749. Id. 5 8, 654 N.W.2d at 765.
750. Id.
751. Id. T 12, 654 N.W.2d at 766.
752. Id. 14, 654 N.W.2d at 767.




757. Id. 5 20, 654 N.W.2d at 768-69.
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was "prompted not by a need or desire for money, but by the abundance of
the vegetables he had produced." 758 Since Wanner's gardening was not
"work," it was not material. 759 The court concluded that a reasoning mind
could not reasonably find that Wanner's failure to report the receipt of a
minimal amount of money apart from work could have misled the Bureau
to the point that it was material. 760
Next, the court discussed whether Wanner's helping out on a friend's
farm by driving a truck during harvest constituted "work." 761 The court
found that, in this instance, none of the characteristics of "work" were
present.762 There was no employee-employer relationship, Wanner was not
paid for his services, it was not a means for livelihood, it was merely
something Wanner did to defeat boredom, and as Wanner testified, it was
"very good therapy and making me feel like a human being being able to do
something." 763 The court determined that a reasoning mind could not
reasonably find that Wanner's response to the Bureau's question would
qualify as a willfully false statement.764
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred in the opinion. 765 Chief Justice
VandeWalle's main contention was the court not mentioning that Wanner
was injured driving a truck, and he was driving a truck for a friend.766 He
stated that since there was uncontradicted evidence that Wanner only drove
the truck when he felt well and not on a regular basis, that his actions would
not rise to the level of "work" especially since neither the statutes nor
administrative codes contain a definition of the word "work."767
Justice Neumann added a short concurrence in which he states that he
believes that the Bureau should have a definition of the word "work" for the
purposes of complying with section 65-05-08(3).768
Justice Sandstrom wrote a dissenting opinion. 769 His main contention
with the majority was that he felt that the court substituted its judgment for
that of the fact finder.770 He felt that the materiality of the




762. Id. 26, 654 N.W.2d at 771-72.
763. Id. J 28.






770. Id. 50, 654 N.W.2d at 775.
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misrepresentations was a question of law, which should be decided by the
Bureau.771 He agreed with the district court in that Wanner's false state-
ments were material and that his future benefits should be terminated.772
771. Id.
772. Id. 1 52.
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